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Notes from the Editor in Chief
As Editor in Chief, I
would like to thank all the students, faculty, and lawyers
who have invested in the idea
of the College of Law’s Business and Tax Law Association
that the College of Law, its
students, and the practicing
bar would be well served by
the publication of a journal
focusing on transactional
practice. Without their efforts,
the publication of this inaugural issue of Transactions
would not have been possible.
This journal serves several purposes. First, it provides students with an opportunity to learn about business
and transactional law topics
by researching and writing
essays or synopses to be published in the journal. The
journal also serves the legal

Your Complimentary Copy
Complimentary copies of Transactions are being distributed to
introduce this new journal to the legal community and in particular, to regional business practitioners.
Transactions will be published twice annually by the Center
for Entrepreneurial Law at The University of Tennessee College of Law. Transactions is available as a printed hardcopy
delivered by mail or an electronic version delivered by e-mail.
Please show your support by reading and passing on this complimentary copy.

profession by alerting transactional practitioners to legal developments affecting their practices. Finally, Transactions is intended as a showcase for The
University of Tennessee College
of Law, its Center for Entrepreneurial Law, and the talents of
its students.
The journal is divided into
three main sections. The first
contains general information
about the Center for Entrepreneurial Law and other business
law activities at the College of
Law. It will highlight recent and
upcoming Center activities and
the students, faculty, and practitioners who support these activities. The second section includes synopses of recent cases
and statutory or regulatory action of particular interest to business and transactional law practitioners in Tennessee and the
Southeastern region. The third
section includes short articles on
various topics of interest to business lawyers. We anticipate offering a mix of articles written
by students, practicing attorneys,
and academic writers, aiming to
provide attorneys with practical
information on current issues.
I hope you enjoy this
complimentary copy of Transactions and find it useful. I know
I enjoyed working on it for you.
Thomas A. Kulaga
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The University of Tennessee College of Law
1505 West Cumberland Ave.
Knoxville, TN 37996-1810
e-mail: pierce@libra.law.utk.edu
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Professors Robert Lloyd and Carl Pierce
The Faculty Behind the Center for Entrepreneurial Law
The College of Law owes
a debt of gratitude to Professor
Robert M. Lloyd for his contributions as the first director of the
College’s new Center for Entrepreneurial Law. During his tenure, Professor Lloyd helped develop the curriculum for the
business transactions concentration. More generally, his efforts
laid the foundation from which
the Center’s future programming
will arise.
Professor Lloyd came to
The University of Tennessee
College of Law from Los AngeSeated left to right are Professors Robert Lloyd and Carl Pierce.
les, California where he practiced
commercial law with a large law firm. Through this
From the beginning, Lloyd has unselfishly conexperience, he came to realize the need for better law
tributed to the improvement of the Center and its proschool training of new lawyers interested in a
grams. He soon discovered that serving as Director of
transactional practice.
the Center was demanding time that he would rather
spend teaching and writing about commercial law—the
The changing market for legal services was
activities that had attracted him to the College of Law in
one of the key motivating factors for the creation
the first place. Confident that the curricular concentraof the business transactions program. The Coltion afforded the Center a solid footing for further
lege of Law had a wonderful program for stugrowth, Professor Lloyd decided it was time to pass the
dents interested in advocacy but did not have a
baton to someone else.
comparable program for those with business interests. Lloyd realized that a high-quality transProfessor Carl Pierce has now assumed the reins
actional curriculum would help those students
as director of the Center for Entrepreneurial Law. Alsecure high-quality employment upon graduathough his primary academic interest is Professional
tion and more rapidly adjust to the demands of a
Responsibility, he also teaches Contracts, Corporate Fifast-moving transactional practice. What emerged
nance, Business Associations, Agency & Partnership, and
was a vision of a Center for Entrepreneurial Law
Securities Regulation. Pierce’s separate interests in Busifor the College of Law, the centerpiece of which
ness Associations and Professional Responsibility have,
would be a curricular concentration in business
in recent years, led him to pay special attention to the
transactions.
professional responsibilities of corporate counsel and
transactional lawyers. He frequently speaks on these
Then-Dean Richard Wirtz, the faculty, and
matters at Continuing Legal Education seminars throughsupportive alumni quickly realized the wisdom
out the state. In addition to his responsibilities as Diof Lloyd’s vision and began to support his efforts
rector of the Center, Pierce is currently serving as the
to convert his vision into reality. The result was
Reporter for the Tennessee Bar Association Committee
the birth of the College of Law’s Center for Enfor the Study of Standards of Professional Conduct.
trepreneurial Law, the development of the busiAlso, he is one of the two Reporters for the American
ness transactions concentration, and the eventual
Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Rules of
graduation in 1996 of the first group of students
Professional Conduct.
to successfully complete the concentration.

Fall 1999
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Although Pierce has many responsibilities in other
areas, he is devoted to the development of the Center
for Entrepreneurial Law. Always on the lookout for
ways to further strengthen the transactions curriculum,
Pierce is particularly interested in having the Center sponsor a broader range of programs. He wants the Center
not only to provide an educational opportunity to the
students, but also to provide useful services to the
bench, bar, and public. These services will also provide meaningful co-curricular and extracurricular activities for students who have a special interest in transactional practice and will lead to closer ties between the
business bar and the College of Law. Some of these
activities include a monthly speaker’s series, a student
pamphlet series, a practitioner pamphlet series, a series
of legal bibliographic pamphlets focusing on various
aspects of transactional practice, the sponsorship of
Continuing Legal Education programs, and the publication of Transactions.
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Eventually, Professor Pierce would like to oversee the creation of a course that focuses exclusively on
the provision of legal services to corporate clients. This
course could be required for students in the joint J.D./
M.B.A. program but would also be available as an elective to other students. In the class, students would learn
about how corporations procure and lawyers deliver efficient, high-quality legal services that are responsive to
the needs of an ever-more demanding and dynamic corporate clientele.
All of this activity is consistent with the College
of Law’s commitment to prepare its graduates for success in the job market and in their legal careers. Through
the energy and talents of faculty members like Professors Lloyd and Pierce, the Center for Entrepreneurial
Law has become a distinctive program in which the College of Law’s students and alumni can take pride.
Donrua Hulsey

The Center for Entrepreneurial Law
at The University of Tennessee College of Law
Conceived five years ago as part of a plan to provide a more coherent academic program for those students who aspire to represent clients in business transactions rather than lawsuits, the Center for Entrepreneurial Law now serves as the focal point for the College of Law’s ongoing effort to be a regional and national leader in teaching, scholarship, and public service
relating to transactional practice. Through the efforts
of our promoters and investors—faculty, students, the
University administration, and many loyal alumni—the
Center is now turning an educational profit. Of particular importance to the Center’s success has been the
leadership of Professor Bob Lloyd, my predecessor as
Director of the Center, and major financial commitments
by Woolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter, PLLC;
Richard and Donna Plumley; and a donor who wishes to
remain anonymous.
With respect to our primary mission—the preparation of our students for the transactional practice of
law—the profit has already been substantial and the prospects for future profits look good. At the heart of the
Center is our curricular concentration in business transactions in which students take 19 hours of prescribed
coursework (Business Associations, Commercial law, Land
Finance, Fundamentals of Income Taxation, Taxation of
Business Organization, and Contract Drafting) as the
prerequisite for a capstone course. Representing Enterprises is that capstone course and it requires each student to plan and draft documents for a variety of simulated transactions. The success of this curricular innoVolume 1 Number 1

Carl A. Pierce, Director

vation is due in large part to the efforts of practicing
transactional attorneys who have shared their knowledge and experience with our students in Contract Drafting and Representing Enterprises. Another curricular
option within the Center is our J.D.-M.B.A. program in
which our students can earn both a J.D. and an M.B.A.
degree in four years. One can, of course, envision a
future in which the Center will house new, different,
and even better curricular options for our students who
aspire to be business lawyers.
With respect to our mission to promote scholarship and provide public service, we have also turned a
respectable profit. The Center has brought distinguished
lawyers to the College of Law, including Daniel
Mahoney, a nationally known expert on partnering between corporate legal departments and law firms. Wyatt,
Tarrant & Combs, through the good offices of Thomas
R. Dyer, ‘66, sponsored his visit. Jim Clayton, ‘64, CEO
of Clayton Homes, Inc., joined us for four days as our
first Distinguished Entrepreneur in Residence. The details of that visit are detailed in the next article. The
Center has sponsored or co-sponsored a variety of Continuing Legal Education programs (including the annual
program the Center co-sponsors with the Tennessee
Chapter of the American Corporate Counsel Association).
As a public service, the Center has published and
distributed a student-authored pamphlet alerting prospective small business entrepreneurs to some of the legal
issues associated with starting a new business. Currently
Fall 1999
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in the works is a similar student-authored pamphlet addressed to aspiring franchisees and a practitioner-authored
pamphlet on Real Estate Investment Trusts. You are
reading the first volume of Transactions, an electronic
and hard copy publication intended to inform transactional lawyers about the Center and its activities, to note
recent developments in and new literature about transactional practice, and to serve as a vehicle for the publication of short essays by students, faculty, and practitioners about topics of interest to transactional practitioners.
The future is bright. We will be hiring a new faculty member who will teach in the corporate and securities area and who we will expect to make significant
contributions to the Center. The University has funded
a new position that we will use to hire a new Director
for the Center, a step that will enable the current Direc-

Transactions TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW
tor to direct his attention to curricular and outreach initiatives focused on the professional responsibilities of
transactional lawyers. Our new Dean—Tom Galligan—
has just announced an extraordinarily generous gift of
Jim and Kay Clayton. It is surely fitting that our Center
will bear their names. I am also very encouraged by my
conversations about the Center with numerous alumni
and transactional practitioners who have applauded our
concept, made suggestions for improvement and new
directions, and volunteered to help. My vision of the
Center for Entrepreneurial Law, then, is that of a young
but ambitious enterprise that is well-positioned to takeoff as a major player in the preparation of law students
for careers in transactional practice and in the ongoing
efforts of transactional lawyers to improve the quality
of the service they render to their clients.

Knoxville Businessman James L. Clayton
1998 Distinguished Entrepreneur in Residence at UT College of Law
In April 1998, the faculty and students of the College of Law welcomed James L. Clayton as the Center
for Entrepreneurial Law’s first Distinguished Entrepreneur in Residence. Mr. Clayton is a 1964 graduate of
the College of Law and the founder and current CEO
and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Clayton
Homes, Inc. In his capacity as Distinguished Entrepreneur in Residence and drawing on his long experience
as an entrepreneurial client, Jim Clayton made presentations and provided materials for discussion in four law
classes plus a faculty forum. He returned to the College of Law to be the featured speaker at a well-attended public Continuing Legal Education forum focusing on “Entrepreneurial Perspectives on Law and
Lawyers.” Joining Clayton at the CLE forum were Patrick
W. Semegen, the then General Counsel at Clayton Homes,
Inc.; Tamara E. Boyer, the General Counsel at Vanderbilt
Mortgage and Finance Inc. (Clayton Homes’ whollyowned finance subsidiary); and Thomas N. McAdams, a
partner in Bernstein, Stair and McAdams, the law firm
that has for many years served as the primary outside
counsel for Clayton Homes, Inc., and its affiliated companies.
Clayton’s visit is the first of what the Center hopes
will be a regular program of extended visits to the College of Law by distinguished business lawyers and business clients. The Center’s goal is to increase contacts
between the College of Law and the world of transactional practice. With this goal, the Center hopes to enrich the educational experience of our students, promote careful thought about transactional practice, and
provide useful programming that meets the needs of
transactional lawyers who are looking for relevant continuing legal education programs. In particular, the DisFall 1999

tinguished Entrepreneur in Residence program recognizes the importance of including clients and lawyerclient “teams” in an ongoing dialogue about how lawyers can better serve business clients in a changing legal
and business environment.
The Center is extremely grateful that Clayton was
willing to be our inaugural Distinguished Entrepreneur
in Residence. His career has taken him from being the
founder of a fledgling and struggling small business to
serving as the CEO and Chairman of the Board of an
extremely successful public company, the shares of
which are actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange. He has also served on the board of directors
of several other public companies. Acting individually
and on behalf of his companies, he has purchased businesses and engaged in a wide variety of financing. He
has hired, worked with, and fired lawyers.

Volume 1 Number 1
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Clayton is a strong supporter of the University, as
well as other charitable and civic activities. He especially enjoys helping students. Jim Clayton was just the
right person to inaugurate our effort to bring business
clients and business lawyers into the law school for the
purpose of enhancing the learning experience of our
students.
Clayton started his visit with a presentation to the
100 students enrolled in the Professional Responsibility
course. He spoke about “A Client’s-Eye View of Business Lawyers and their Responsibilities.” He then met
with the faculty for a forum discussion about “Preparing Law Students to Represent Entrepreneurs and Their
Companies.” The next day, he lectured in several classes.
He spoke with the Corporate Finance class about “Legal and Business Consideration in Buying Banks.” In
the Business Associations class, he spoke about “Corporate Governance.” Finally, in the Representing Enterprises class, he spoke about “Asset Purchases and
Securitization.” In addition to five-and-one-half hours
of teaching, he hosted a lunch for student leaders from
our Business and Tax Law Association and this Journal.
During his lectures, Clayton provided samples of lawyer work product such as corporate charters and bylaws,
merger agreements, asset purchase agreements, regulatory filings, and a due diligence checklist for buying a
bank. These materials, plus Clayton’s experience as a
client, his willingness to speak openly and candidly, and
his sincere interest in our students made his visit a great
success.
For the CLE program, Clayton (as the business client), was joined by his primary lawyersPatrick Semegen, Tamara Boyer and Thomas
McAdams. The Center was pleased to welcome
all to the College of Law, but it was especially
honored to be able to introduce and welcome
Pat Semegen to Knoxville and the Knoxville bar.
He had recently joined Clayton Homes, Inc., as
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its General Counsel. Semegen
comes to Knoxville after a long
and successful stint as General
Counsel at Western Auto, Inc.
The thrust of the CLE program was a discussion of how clients and lawyers work together as
a team to further the accomplishment of the business objectives
of the client when, to borrow a
phrase from Jim Clayton, there are
“legals” involved. The three hour
program was well-received by the
fifty lawyers in attendance.
Without a doubt, Jim
Clayton’s visit as the first Distinguished Entrepreneur in Residence was a wonderful way to inaugurate this prong of the Center’s efforts to connect
the College of Law with the world of transactional practice. We extend a sincere thank you to Jim Clayton, our
distinguished entrepreneur, and to his distinguished lawyers. They made an important contribution to the College of Law by sharing their limited time and substantial
talents and experience with our students and with those
lawyers who came “back to school” for our CLE forum.
Carl A. Pierce, Director,
Center for Entrepreneurial Law

Fall 1999

8

Transactions TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

An Extraordinary Opportunity: The Joint J.D./M.B.A. Program
The University of Tennessee’s joint J.D./
M.B.A. program offers students the unique opportunity to earn two graduate degrees simultaneously. In four years, a participant is able to
earn a Doctorate of Jurisprudence and a Masters
in Business Administration. If pursued separately,
the two degrees take a total of five years to
complete. To qualify for the program, joint degree students must be admitted individually into
both colleges. Students may begin their studies
in either college but they must enroll solely in
law or business school courses for the first year
of each program.
After the first year in each college, students
may earn the remaining credit hours in any combination of their choice, provided that they meet
all requirements of both programs. To satisfy the
curriculum requirements of both colleges in four
years, each college accepts nine credit hours from
the other college. The Graduate Business School
requires that the nine hours transferred be business related law courses. The College of Law
accepts any graduate-level business credits, other
than first-year core course work, on the assumption that all business courses are law related.
While enrolled in the joint J.D./M.B.A. program,
students may concentrate their studies in a certain field within each school, such as advocacy
or business transactions in the law school, or
marketing or finance in the business school.
The University founded the joint degree program to promote several fundamental goals. First,
the program is based on the premise that a highly
integrated program in both law and business so
fundamentally enriches a student’s learning that
any reduction in total credit hours is greatly outweighed by such an experience. The two programs emphasize radically different learning
structures and allow students to develop distinct
skills.
The M.B.A. program focuses on learning
through the integration of business disciplines,
such as marketing and finance, in a first-year
core curriculum based upon the initial start-up of
a business. In the context of building this enterprise, each student works in a team throughout
the first year and much of the second year of the
program. M.B.A. students learn to work with
associates in addition to gaining valuable
communication skills and substantive business
knowledge.
The J.D. program emphasizes legal reasoning and analytical skills, as well as the development of strong writing skills. The first year curFall 1999

riculum, generally prescribed for every student,
includes fundamental legal courses such as civil
procedure, contracts, torts, and legal writing.
Thereafter, law students may choose from a number of elective courses. In addition, the College
of Law offers concentrations in both trial advocacy and business transactions. The J.D. and
M.B.A. programs offer distinct skills valuable in
the practice of both law and business. Their integration within the joint degree program provides
students with a rich and varied learning experience.
As a second goal, the joint degree program
strives to provide students with many potential
career paths after graduation. Students are well
equipped to enter either the world of management or the practice of law. The double-degree
gives students strong legal reasoning and problem solving skills as well as a comprehensive
understanding of their clients’ unique needs and
viewpoints. A graduate may experience a shortterm advantage in finding employment. However, the primary benefit of a joint degree is that
a student acquires both an understanding of the
dynamic interdependent relationship between law
and business, and the framework in which to
solve the problems posed by this complex interrelationship.
Third, the joint degree program is designed
to prepare students for an increasingly complex
and interrelated legal and business world. The
student who prefers to practice law has been
exposed to the problem-solving approach of business executives and can, therefore, structure legal advice to be most beneficial to either a business or a corporate client. In addition, an attorney with an M.B.A. degree is better prepared to
undertake management decisions in a law firm
as it increases in both size and complexity. Alternatively, the student who prefers to enter the
business field as an executive can more effectively anticipate and solve the many legal problems that are inevitably intertwined with many
business decisions.
Intense and challenging, the J.D./M.B.A.
program provides many rewards to those who
will commit themselves to four years blending
the best of legal and business education. The
joint degree program provides the prospective
attorney or business executive with the broad
and flexible problem-solving skills so vital to the
complex legal and business world of the twentyfirst century.
Gregory E. Glass, J.D./M.B.A
Volume 1 Number 1
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SYNOPSES
ANTITRUST
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997)
For the last thirty years, lawyers for manufacturers who wanted to control the retail price
charged by resellers have had to advise their
clients that vertical maximum price fixing was a
per se violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1994). In support, lawyers would cite the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 88 S. Ct. 869 (1968). In State Oil,
however, the United States Supreme Court overruled Albrecht and held that vertical maximum
price fixing is not a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.
Khan entered into an agreement with State
Oil Co. (State Oil) whereby Khan leased and operated a service station owned by State Oil. Under the agreement, Khan procured his supply of
gasoline from State Oil at a price equal to the
suggested retail price set by State Oil, less a
fixed margin that represented Khan’s profit. Khan
was free to sell the gasoline at a price lower
than State Oil’s suggested retail price, but the
loss in per-gallon revenue reduced Khan’s fixed
margin. If Khan sold the gasoline at a price
higher than the suggested retail price, State Oil
received a rebate of the excess marginal price.
After Khan became delinquent on his lease payments, State Oil moved to terminate the lease
agreement. Khan filed suit in the United States
District Court alleging that the lease agreement
effectively prevented him from raising or lowering retail gas prices, and therefore, State Oil was
in violation of the Sherman Act’s prohibition
against price fixing.
Typically, courts consider Sherman Act violations under a “rule of reason” test whereby an
agreement must be an unreasonable restraint on
trade to violate the Act. However, where a particular activity has a “predictable and pernicious
anticompetitive effect,” the Supreme Court labels the activity as a per se violation of the Act.
To recover in such a case, a plaintiff must simply
prove that the activity occurred. In Albrecht v.
Herald Co., the Supreme Court held that vertical
maximum price fixing was a per se violation of
Volume 1 Number 1

the Sherman Act. Commentators and courts alike
have sharply criticized the Court’s decision in
Albrecht. The Court has since limited the scope
of per se violations of the Sherman Act.
In State Oil, the Supreme Court noted that
fixed low prices generally facilitate competition,
provided that they do not reach the level of
predatory prices. Further, since many retailers
operate in restricted districts granted by their
wholesalers, vertical maximum price fixing may
actually protect the consumer by preventing exploitation of local monopolies. The Court concluded that, while vertical maximum price fixing
may in some instances result in a “restraint on
trade” under the Sherman Act, the effects are not
so consistently anticompetitive as to warrant a
per se violation of the Act.
This decision significantly alters the legal
environment in which lawyers will be advising
their clients about the antitrust implications of
vertical maximum price fixing agreements. Vertical maximum price fixing schemes are no longer
per se illegal. The question lawyers will now
have to answer is whether their clients’ fixing of
a maximum resale price for their products will
unreasonably restrain competition. To do this,
they will have to take into account the factors
usually considered in rule of reason cases, such
as the nature of their client’s business, its condition before and after the maximum pricing
scheme was instituted, and the precise nature
and effect of the pricing scheme in use.
Christopher Schwab

BANKING
First American Nat’l Bank v. National
Project Servs., Inc., No. 01-A-01-9702-CH0005, 1997 WL 576341 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept.
17, 1997), reh’g denied (Oct. 17, 1997)
Wholesalers and retailers use various financing techniques for their inventories to smooth
cash flows for their operations. Some examples
of such financing techniques include floor-planning, lines of credit, and financing specific purchase orders. While lenders memorialize their
respective duties through written agreements, a
good faith obligation is implied in every conFall 1999
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tract. In First American, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals considered whether a bank had an implied duty to give reasonable notice of its intent
to stop extending credit to a business.
National Project Services, Inc. (NPS) was in
the business of reselling industrial supplies. To
fund its inventory purchases, NPS borrowed from
First American to cover specific purchase orders.
In 1990, First American established a line of credit
to finance NPS’s operations. First American increased this line of credit to $180,000 in 1991,
and NPS subsequently drew the whole line. In
1992, First American ceased making individual
loans to finance NPS’s purchase orders, assuring
NPS that loans would be resumed when a transfer of NPS’s account to the bank’s central office
was completed. NPS did not look for any other
source of financing and continued to solicit orders at the same level. In 1993, First American
finally notified NPS that it would not extend any
more credit to NPS to finance individual purchase orders. By this time, NPS had exhausted
its working capital, and it ceased operations.
An implied duty to give reasonable notice
of termination of credit exists if one has a reasonable expectation of continued credit. Where
a bank customer has an existing written line of
credit and the requested draw is within the available line, the bank has a good faith obligation to
provide notice to a customer to allow a reasonable opportunity to find other financing sources.
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759
(6th Cir. 1985).
In the present case, NPS had fully drawn its
available line of credit. The oral promises by
First American were not in any specific amount
or for any specific period of time. Because First
American was not obligated to fund any purchase orders, the bank did not have any duty to
notify NPS of its intention to stop extending credit.
NPS had no reasonable expectation of continued
credit to fund purchase orders. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that
First American had no implied duty of notification.
Attorneys for lenders should advise their clients that they have a good faith obligation to
advance funds that are within a customer’s granted
line of credit. Generally, a bank customer has a
reasonable expectation of continued credit when
Fall 1999
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the bank has obligated itself to provide such credit.
This obligation may impose a duty on the bank
to give notice to its customer when the bank
refuses to advance funds within the line of credit.
Attorneys for bank customers should advise their
clients that assurances of credit extensions not
specific as to amount and duration fail to create a
reasonable expectation of continued credit.
Tommy G. Meredith

CONTRACTS
Majors Jewelers v. A.B.X., Inc., 117 F.3d 922
(5th Cir. 1997)
As more business is conducted on a national
and international basis, more goods will be
shipped by air. There is always a risk that shipped
goods will be lost or destroyed. In Majors Jewelers, the Fifth Circuit considered whether, after a
jeweler’s shipments were lost, an air carrier had
effectively limited its liability by providing in its
airbills and service guide that it would neither
accept nor be liable for shipments of jewelry.
The court also considered whether the federal
court had jurisdiction over the case as one involving federal common law, and whether the
plaintiff’s state law claims had been preempted
by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA).
Majors Jewelers (Majors) contracted with
A.B.X. d/b/a Airborne Express (Airborne), an air
carrier, to transport three shipments marked as
“merchandise” from Texas to New York. Each of
these shipments contained jewelry. The back of
the airbills, completed by the jeweler, listed items
for which Airborne would not be liable in the
invent of a loss. This standard airbill made reference to the carrier’s service guide (which was
readily available). The service guide specifically mentioned jewelry as an item that could not
be shipped. The three shipments never arrived
in New York, and the jeweler brought suit.
After an extensive discussion of the history
of federal regulation of air transport, the Court of
Appeals held that federal common law governs
the liability of air carriers for lost or damaged
cargo. The court noted that the federal common
law predated statutory regulation and the regulatory acts contained saving provisions preserving
this cause of action.
Applying federal common law, the court held
that the airbill serves as a contract for carriage in
Volume 1 Number 1
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transactions with air carriers. Carrier liability may
be contractually limited if the limiting provision
is sufficiently plain and conspicuous, as shown
by a two-part test. First, examination of the physical characteristics of the airbill must indicate evidence of reasonable notice. Additionally, the
conditions under which the carriage was made
must indicate that the customer was not misled.
The shipper’s familiarity with the shipping process typically satisfies the second condition.
The airbill that Majors signed was Airborne’s
standard airbill. Although the only specific reference to Airborne’s disclaimer of liability for
shipment of jewelry was contained in a service
guide that Airborne made available to customers
only upon request, the court found that Airborne
had given plain and conspicuous notice because
there was a conspicuous notice on the front of
the bill directing the customer to the terms and
conditions on the back side of the airbill, which
in turn directed the customer to the service guide
that was available upon request. With respect to
the second prong of the test, the court emphasized that Majors was an experienced shipper,
having shipped on an almost daily basis for several years, and had ample opportunity and incentive to examine the airbill with care and to
obtain and similarly examine the service guide.
Under these circumstances, the court held that
Airborne’s disclaimer of liability for lost jewelry
was binding on Majors.
Majors also asserted a claim alleging violations of the Texas Deceptive Fair Practice-Consumer Protection Act. The court held that the
ADA preempted claims based on state statutory
regulation of air transport. Allowing the state
law claims would permit Texas to impose its own
standards on air carrier service and that would be
inconsistent with the ADA.
After Majors Jewelers, lawyers for clients
who regularly ship valuable goods by air would
be well-advised to brush up on the federal common law governing common carriers. Lawyers
should also fully read their clients’ airbills or counsel their clients to read their airbills and question
what they do not understand. To be fully informed about the terms and conditions governing a proposed shipment, the lawyer needs to
heed the references and cross-references on the
airbill to other terms and conditions printed on
Volume 1 Number 1
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the the airbill or contained in other documents,
such as service guides. Air transport companies,
on the other hand, might be well advised to place
all disclaimers of liability in the airbill, even if a
second page is needed to do so, rather than leaving them in a service guide. These companies
would be well advised to take the initiative and
provide all regular customers with a copy of the
current version of any service guide referenced
in the airbill.
Matthew Bashore
Big Yank Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
125 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 1997)
Procuring reasonably priced workers compensation insurance is important to many businesses.
Premiums will depend on how a
company’s claims experience relates to the industry average. In Big Yank, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied Kentucky law to resolve a controversy between Liberty Mutual and
Big Yank. The controversy arose over increased
premiums that Big Yank had to pay because of
Liberty Mutual’s alleged “bad faith” handling of
an influx of claims filed by Big Yank’s employees shortly after Big Yank announced that it was
closing the plant where they worked.
Plaintiff Big Yank Corporation, a clothing
manufacturer, entered into a contract with Liberty Mutual pursuant to which Liberty Mutual
would provide Big Yank’s employee’s with workers compensation insurance. According to express terms of the policy, Liberty Mutual agreed
to “defend Big Yank against any workers compensation claims … but had the sole right to investigate and settle [any] claims, proceedings or
suits.”
In 1991, Big Yank announced the closing of
one of its facilities. Within the next few weeks,
429 workers compensation claims were filed by
108 employees, which was considerably more
than in prior comparable time periods. Liberty
Mutual opened a file for each of the 429 claims,
established a reserve for what was expected to
be paid on each claim, and reported the claims
to the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), the organization that establishes the
ratings that are used for determining the premiums to be charged for workers compensation
insurance. Liberty Mutual submitted the claims
to Big Yank for verification of the validity of
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claims and received no indication that Big Yank
thought the claims were bogus. Subsequently,
Liberty Mutual , with the approval of Big Yank’s
comptroller, settled the claims for $4,800,000.
Because of these claims, NCCI increased Big
Yank’s experience rating from 1.73 to 5.07. Big
Yank claimed the increase would result in payment increases of $6,000,000 for each subsequent year of coverage.
Big Yank filed suit, alleging that Liberty
Mutual acted in bad faith by mishandling the claims
and improperly reporting the claims’ nature to
NCCI. Big Yank then filed for bankruptcy, citing
its financial strain caused by the increase in insurance premiums for its remaining facilities.
Applying Kentucky law, the Sixth Circuit
held that an insurer can only be held liable for
acting in bad faith if it can be shown that the
insurer intentionally engaged in some wrongful
conduct. The court noted that more than mere
negligence is required. The conduct must have
some degree of conscious wrongdoing, recklessness or be an unjustified gamble that puts the
insured at risk. Noting that Liberty Mutual had
acted according to the terms of the policy, had
sought to verify the validity of the claims, and
had settled the claims with the approval of Big
Yank’s comptroller, the court held there was no
evidence of bad faith or even negligence. The
court also generally asserted that “a party’s acting according to the express terms of a contract
cannot be considered a breach of the duties of
good faith and faith dealing.”
Although Big Yank suggests that courts are
unlikely to find bad faith when an insurer processes and settles workman’s compensation claims
in accordance with the terms of the policy in
question, insurers can further minimize the likelihood of such a finding by documenting that the
insured was afforded the opportunity to question
the validity of claims and to approve any settlements that could have a substantial effect on the
insured’s experience rating. To protect against
unexpected increases in the cost of worker’s compensation insurance, on the other hand, the insured companies should monitor the processing
and disposition of claims that are likely to have a
substantial effect on the company’s experience
rating.
Ursula Bailey
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CORPORATIONS
Tennessee Code Annotated § Section 48-17203(b) Corporate Proxies
During the 1998 legislative session, the Tennessee General Assembly amended the corporate proxy laws to keep abreast of business trends
in proxy solicitations. The revised statute allows
for the availability of new communications technology. The amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. §
48-17-203(b) more clearly defines the methods
by which a corporate shareholder may authorize
the appointment of a proxy to vote or otherwise
act on the shareholder’s behalf.
Prior to the 1998 amendment, the statute
provided that shareholders appoint a proxy by
executing a writing. This execution could be
done by “any reasonable means, including facsimile transmission.”
As amended, Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-17-203(b)
provides that transmission of proxy authorization
may now be accomplished by “telegram, cablegram, facsimile or other means of electronic transmission.” However, the means used must contain sufficient information to show that the shareholder authorized the proxy. The statute still
provides that proxies may be executed by a writing.
Larger corporations commonly use proxy solicitation firms or proxy support organizations.
The amended statute specifically identifies the
recipients of transmitted proxies. The recipients
may be proxy solicitation firms, proxy support
organizations, the holder of the proxy, or other
authorized agents. The clear designation of the
groups that may hold the electronically transmitted proxy puts Tennessee in line with current
business trends.
With pressure by corporations to minimize
expenses, corporations will use the cheapest
means of sending and receiving proxy materials.
Corporations are experimenting with soliciting
proxies through the Internet. The amended statute allows “other means of electronic transmission” for proxy materials. However, the statute
requires that there be a method of determining
that the shareholder authorized the proxy. Lawyers representing corporations need to ensure
that their clients handle their proxy materials prop-
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erly, specifically, solicitation by electronic transmission. Lawyers may have to examine the use
of technology to ensure that their clients meet
the statutory requirements.
Jay L. Johnson
McAlister v. Peregrine Enters., Inc., No.
02A01-9610-CH-00262, 1997 WL 746373
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1997)
Most shareholder agreements contain redemption rights for the shareholder. These redemption rights, however, may be subject to state
statutes concerning corporate distributions. In
McAlister, the Tennessee Court of Appeals considered whether a preferred shareholder could
force the corporation to redeem his shares pursuant to his right of redemption when doing so
would render the corporation unable to pay its
debts as they come due.
Peregrine Enterprises sought to raise additional capital by authorizing the designation of
two series of preferred stock and through the
private placement of 520,000 shares of common
stock. McAlister owned preferred stock which
included the right of redemption. McAlister requested the redemption of his preferred stock,
but Peregrine refused to redeem McAlister’s preferred shares, citing two grounds. First, the right
of redemption was conditioned on the successful
offering of the common stock. Second, the redemption would render the corporation unable
to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business.
A redemption of shares by a corporation is
a distribution to a shareholder. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 48-11-201(8) (1995). Distributions to Tennessee corporation shareholders are governed by
T.C.A. § 48-16-401 (1995). A corporation’s indebtedness to a shareholder incurred by reason
of a distribution is at parity with the corporation’s
unsecured creditors except to the extent subordinated by agreement. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4816-401(f). However, no distribution to a shareholder may be made if doing so would render
the corporation unable to pay its debts as they
become due in the usual course of business. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 48-16-401(c)(1).
After reviewing the “entire contract” according to its plain terms, the court found no merit to
Peregrine’s claim that any redemption was conVolume 1 Number 1
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ditioned on the successful common stock offering. As for the second claim, because the trial
court granted McAlister’s motion for summary
judgment, the appellate court assumed that
Peregrine’s redemption of McAlister’s preferred
stock would render Peregrine unable to pay its
ordinary debts to creditors. The court then found
that § 48-16-401(c)(1) does not distinguish between a voluntary distribution and distributions
mandated by contract (which McAlister argued
were not governed by that section). Therefore,
the court found that § 48-16-401(c)(1) prohibited
the redemption of McAlister’s stock if doing so
would render Peregrine unable to pay its debts
as they become due in the usual course of business. The court reversed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of McAlister.
Practitioners need to be aware of Tennessee law concerning distributions to shareholders
under § 48-16-401. These statutes are designed
to protect creditors’ interests. As the court found
in other states, a preferred shareholder may not
force a redemption if it would render the corporation insolvent.
David C. Simcox
Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 488
S.E.2d 215 (N.C. 1997)
Shareholders of a close corporation can play
several roles in the business. In addition to their
role as shareholders, they often serve as directors, employees, and even as individuals with
contractual relations with the business. In Barger,
the North Carolina Supreme Court considered
whether shareholders of a corporation, who had
personally guaranteed the corporation’s debts,
could individually pursue actions against the
corporation’s accounting firm to recover damages
for injuries to the corporation resulting from inaccurate financial statements.
Plaintiffs, as the sole shareholders and directors of The Furniture House, Inc., and acting
on its behalf, employed the Defendant accounting firm to provide accounting services and financial advice. Based on the accountant’s advice that the corporation was financially able to
expand, Plaintiffs expanded their operations. The
expansion required personal guarantees of several loans. After experiencing cash flow shortages, Plaintiffs personally guaranteed additional
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loans because of assurances provided by Defendant that the shortages were temporary. At this
point, a prospective purchaser of the corporation approached Plaintiffs. Defendant valued the
corporation at $800,000. However, the buyer
obtained an independent audit which revealed
accounting errors in the compiled financial statements produced by the Defendant that had concealed the fact that the corporation and Plaintiffs’
shares were worthless. When the corporation
became insolvent, Plaintiffs were required to pay
its debts pursuant to their personal guarantees.
The general rule that a shareholder cannot
pursue individual causes of action against third
parties for injuries to the corporation has two
overlapping exceptions. The general rule will
not apply if there is a special duty owed to the
shareholder by the wrongdoer or if the shareholder suffered a separate or personal injury not
suffered by other shareholders of the corporation. The court held that the general rule, with
the exceptions, applies equally to both shareholders and personal guarantors of corporate
debts. However, the rule and exceptions must
be applied to each role separately.
Plaintiffs, as shareholders, had no claim because they did not satisfy either exception of the
general rule. Plaintiffs, as guarantors, did not
suffer an injury “separate and distinct” from that
of the corporation. However, Plaintiffs relied
upon the accuracy of the Defendant’s financial
statements when they personally guaranteed the
debts. This act created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Defendant owed the
Plaintiffs a special duty as guarantors, separate
from the duty Defendant owed to the corporation itself. The court held that Plaintiffs, as guarantors of the corporation’s debt, may pursue individual actions against the defendant under the
special duty exception to the general rule.
This North Carolina decision recognizes that
members of corporations often wear “different
hats.” More importantly, the decision recognizes
that wearing these different hats can give rise to
different rights. Thus, attorneys rendering advice to members of corporations must make certain to whom they are rendering advice (for example, the corporation or the individual). Though
this can often be a difficult task, it is necessary in
order to determine to whom one will be liable.
Fall 1999
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Conversely, attorneys determining possible causes
of action should always examine possible roles
in which the corporation’s members could have
received and/or relied upon advice from a third
party.
Brian Blind
Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn.
1997)
Close corporations are a fairly common structure in the corporate landscape. The close corporation is characterized by a small number of
shareholders who generally also serve as the
corporation’s directors, officers, and employees.
A breakdown in shareholder relationships in a
close corporation can jeopardize the operations
of the entire organization. In Nelson, two of the
three shareholder-employees in a closely held
corporation discharged the third shareholder-employee. The Tennessee Supreme Court considered two issues of primary importance: (1) whether
the discharged shareholder-employee had a cause
against the other two for wrongful interference
with a prospective economic advantage, and (2)
whether the two shareholder-employees violated
a fiduciary duty owed to the remaining shareholder-employee when they discharged him.
Nelson was one of three equal shareholders
of a corporation. All three shareholders served
as employees and directors and officers of the
corporation. After a dispute between Martin and
Nelson, Martin, acting as president of the corporation, discharged Nelson. At a board of directors meeting, the discharge was ratified by two
of the three shareholder-directors. Additionally,
the two shareholder-directors voted and removed
Nelson as an officer and director of the corporation. Shortly after Nelson’s discharge, all three
shareholders sold their stock.
Tennessee has not previously recognized a
cause of action for wrongful interference with a
prospective economic advantage, either statutorily or at common law. Nonetheless, the court
heard the issue and considered whether it should
be a cause of action. With little discussion, however, the court concluded that there was no cause
of action in Tennessee for wrongful interference
with prospective economic advantage.
In Tennessee, majority shareholders owe a
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders. In Nelson,
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the court concluded that shareholders of a close
corporation also owe a fiduciary duty to each
other to deal fairly and honestly with each other
and not to act out of avarice, malice, or selfinterest. These shareholders also owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation to act in the
corporation’s best interest. Though at times the
two duties may seem conflicting, as long as the
shareholders are protecting the interests of the
corporation, the mere presence of ill-will will
not render them or the corporation liable for their
actions as a breach of a fiduciary duty. Because
the evidence on the record did not present a
disputed issue of material fact with regard to this
issue, the court remanded for further proceedings.
The court failed to address whether Nelson’s
discharge and removal from the board was engineered to make the sale easier, and it also failed
to discuss in adequate detail the reasonable expectation a shareholder-employee would have
of being fired only for cause. Because the court
failed to recognize that a shareholder-employee
would reasonably have such an expectation, attorneys should advise shareholder-employees in
Tennessee to negotiate and set forth that expectation clearly in a written employment agreement.
Shannon D. Coleman
Man O’ War Restaurants, Inc. v. Martin,
932 S.W.2d 366 (Ky. 1997)
Management compensation and incentives
often include stock ownership in the business.
In fact, the stock ownership can become an integral part of the employment contract itself. In
Martin, the Kentucky Supreme Court considered
the enforceability of an employment contract provision which compelled a corporate shareholder
to transfer stock upon termination of his employment without regard to the stock value and without resort to a formula for equitable compensation.
Martin was hired as a manager of a Sizzler
Restaurant owned by Man O’ War Restaurants,
Inc. Martin’s employment contract allowed him
to purchase 25% of the stock in the corporation
for $1,000. The terms of the contract included a
five-year employment agreement and a provision for Martin to return the stock for the exact
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amount he paid if his employment was terminated during those five years. After the five
years, Martin’s ownership rights were unrestricted.
During his employment, Martin could receive
stock dividends and was free to sell his stock at
market price. Less than three years into the contract, the corporation terminated Martin’s employment and demanded the return of his stock for
$1,000. The termination was deemed for good
cause and not for an improper purpose.
A corporation and its shareholders are allowed to contract for a re-purchase or “buy-back”
right, but this right requires that some valuation
method be used in determining the stock price.
Acceptable valuation methods include consideration of the corporation’s fiscal performance and
current financial condition. Also, liquidated damages for breach of contract are permissible in
agreements, but when damages are fixed and
grossly disproportionate, they are nothing more
than a penalty or forfeiture which are unenforceable.
The contract provision failed to recognize
Martin as the owner of the stock independent of
his employment. As stock owner, Martin had
property rights in the stock. Also, the re-purchase provision made no reference to any concept of present value but relied on the stock’s
original purchase price. The court ruled that one
who is compelled to transfer stock for an amount
which bears no relationship to the value of the
stock can hardly be called the owner. Such a
transfer was a form of excessive liquidated damages and thus a forfeiture of property rights, which
is against public policy. The court held the repurchase provision unenforceable.
A lawyer structuring an employment contract with a corporate stock repurchase provision
must have some method of valuation for the stock.
Without some valuation method, the provision
runs the risk of being unenforceable unless the
stock is purchased for book value or fair market
value. Alternatives to repurchase provisions in
employment contracts include stock options that
would be exercisable upon the occurrence of
definite events, such as after a fixed period of
time.
Jon M. Cope
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MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS
Newman v. Warren, 684 A.2d 1239 (Del.
1996)
Proxy statements are widely used to increase
voting efficiency in matters concerning shareholders. Proxies contain recommendations from
the board of directors as to how they would like
shareholders to cast their votes. In Newman , a
Delaware Chancery Court considered whether,
under the fiduciary duty of candor, it was necessary for a proxy statement to contain a board
member’s reason for not endorsing a transaction
that the majority of the board of directors recommended.
Professional Sports Care Management, Inc.
(PSCM), a provider of outpatient physical therapy
and rehabilitation services, was considering a
merger with HealthSouth, Corp., also a provider
of outpatient surgery and rehabilitative services.
During a PSCM board meeting, members discussed
the status of negotiations with HealthSouth. At
the meeting, two members voiced concerns over
the merger’s possible effect on an upstart subsidiary of PSCM. At a subsequent meeting, which
the two concerned members did not attend, the
board of directors unanimously recommended the
merger.
A PSCM shareholder filed suit claiming that
the board of directors had failed to disclose facts
material to a shareholder decision to approve or
reject a proposed merger agreement. Specifically, the shareholder claimed that the proxy statement should have contained the grounds for the
judgment of two directors who did not vote in
favor of the merger.
The law of fiduciary disclosure requires the
disclosure of material facts but not the grounds
for a particular decision. Generally, institutional
rules require only that a certain percentage of
board members agree on a specific outcome. This
is true whether the institution is a legislature,
appellate court, or a corporate board. The
Newman court found that the grounds for the
judgment of two directors was not a material fact
for which disclosure was required.
Under Newman, a company’s proxy statement does not have to include a board member’s
reason for dissension where the majority of the
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board has recommended the transaction to the
shareholders. Requiring companies to disclose
the reasons for a particular decision causes practical and logical problems since board members
may agree on a specific outcome but for different reasons. Requiring board members to agree
on the reasons for an outcome, as well as the
outcome, could make the agreement process
lengthy, complicated and expensive.
In addition to its primary holding, the court
also held that, under the facts of this case, it was
not necessary for the proxy statement to disclose
familial relationships among directors or to disclose consulting contracts that the directors may
enter into following approval of the merger. Only
material facts relating to the company and the
transaction are required to be disclosed.
Attorneys representing board members and
corporations must consider the related fiduciary
duties of these parties. Newman demonstrates
that the fiduciary duties of a corporation to its
shareholders require the disclosure in proxy statements of only information material to the company or a particular transaction. Also, a fiduciary
duty does not extend to directors to include reasoning for a dissenting vote in a proxy statement
where a majority of the board of directors has
approved the recommended transaction.
Nancy Wood

PARTNERSHIP
Riggan v. Askew , No. 02A01-9511-CH-00246,
1997 WL 675462 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29,
1997)
When a partnership suffers losses, the sharing of those losses among the partners can become a bone of contention. This is particularly
true when some partners have lost more money
than others because they had provided more of
the capital that was lost in the conduct of the
partnership business. In Riggan , the Tennessee
Court of Appeals reviewed a judgment of the
Chancery Court resolving a dispute between two
partners over whether one partner, who had advanced most of the money needed for the business, could force the other partner, who contributed much less money but assumed almost exclusive responsibility for running the business, to
share in his losses.
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In 1974, the plaintiff, Riggan, offered the
defendant, Askew, an opportunity to enter into
an industrial development scheme that involved
the purchase of 200 acres of resale property in
Mississippi. The two men formed a partnership
but did not reduce their agreement to writing.
Both men understood that Riggan would be the
primary financial contributor and that Askew
would use his expertise and real estate contacts
to market the property to potential buyers. By
1989, when the partnership was dissolved as a
result of Riggan’s personal bankruptcy, Riggan
had invested $638,000 in the venture, compared
to $72,000 invested by Askew. After the sale of
the partnership’s property and the distribution of
the proceeds to satisfy claims against the partnership, Riggan had lost $150,000 more than
Askew.
Tax returns filed by the partnership
following dissolution also confirmed that Riggan
lost $150,000 more than Askew.
Riggan thought Askew ought to share the
loss. Askew disagreed. In 1992, after the breakdown of their efforts to resolve their differences,
Riggan filed for an accounting in Chancery Court,
alleging that he had loaned the partnership the
$638,000 and was entitled to be repaid the principal with interest. He then claimed that Askew,
as a co-equal partner, was legally obligated to
bear 50% of Riggan’s additional losses, $75,000
as lost principal and $274,380 as unpaid interest.
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the Tennessee Uniform Partnership Act provides that partners must share losses, capital or
otherwise, in proportion to the partners’ share of
the profits. It also provides that a partner who
makes a capital contribution is not entitled to
interest on the amount contributed until such time
as the partner is entitled to return of the capital
investment. On the other hand, a partner who
advances funds to the partnership in excess of
capital is entitled to be paid interest on the amounts
advanced. At trial, Riggan testified that he and
Askew had agreed that the $638,000 he advanced
to the partnership was a loan for which Askew
would be liable. Askew in turn contended that
he and Riggan had agreed that Riggan would
bear all risk that his investment might be lost. As
support for this contention, Askew introduced
evidence of his agreement to allow Riggan to
use the partnership property as security for per-
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sonal loans to Riggan, an action he said evidenced
his belief that Riggan was to bear all the financial
risk associated with the partnership. The chancellor ruled that Askew had failed to prove an
agreement with Riggan whereby Askew would
not be required to share in the losses suffered by
Riggan. The chancellor also ruled that Riggan’s
advances to the partnership should be treated as
loans on which interest was payable rather than
as capital contributions.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment. In so doing, the court held that
Riggan was not judicially estopped from asserting his claim by failure to list the claim against
Askew in his bankruptcy petition. The court
also rejected Askew’s claim that the filing of a
partnership tax return upon its dissolution operates as a final settlement of its accounts. Then
the court rejected Askew’s claim that Riggan’s
action was barred by the six year statute of limitations applicable to contract claims. The court
held that a partner may only seek reimbursement for advances to the partnership in an action
for an accounting, and such a claim could not
have accrued until the dissolution of the partnership in 1989. With respect to the merits of the
claim, the court found no error in the chancellor’s
holding that Askew had not proven an agreement with Riggan that would exempt Askew from
a partner’s statutory responsibility to share all
losses in proportion to his or her share of the
profits. Finally, the court refused to consider
Askew’s challenge to the chancellor’s characterization of Riggan’s advances as a loan because
Askew’s brief did not point to any part of the
trial record in which objection was made to the
award of interest on Riggan’s contribution to the
partnership.
Riggan serves as yet one more reminder
that prospective partners need to be advised that
Tennessee’s partnership law provides for sharing among partners of all losses, capital or other,
in proportion to their respective share of the profits, but permits partners to agree to allocate such
losses differently. As evidenced by this case,
however, such agreements should be in writing.
This case also serves as a reminder of the distinction drawn in the Tennessee Partnership Act
between a partner’s capital contributions, which
do not accrue interest during the life of the en-
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terprise, and “payments or advances beyond the
amount of capital [the partner] agreed to contribute, which shall be paid interest from the date of
the advance.” Again, the Partnership Act permits partners to characterize a partner’s contribution as either a capital contribution or as a loan.
Because of the importance of this characterization, it should also be memorialized in a writing.
Such written agreements about the financing of
the partnership and how losses will be shared
may not prevent business failures, but they should
prevent the additional losses that all partners are
likely to suffer if they must resort to litigation to
resolve who among the partners ought to bear
the partnership’s losses.
Emily B. Holloway
Meyers v. Cole, No. 01A01-9710-CH-00543,
1998 WL 485667 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19,
1998)
Where no written partnership agreement
controls, dissolution of a partnership can give
rise to numerous complications. Although the
Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”) sets forth the
rights and responsibilities of partners in connection with dissolution, winding up, and termination, determining the respective rights of the partners can be difficult. This is especially true where
there has been a falling out among partners, one
or more of whom continue separately to conduct
business as they had done prior to dissolution,
and in which they make use of copyrighted materials authored by another partner in the course
of the partnership’s business. Such was the situation presented to the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Meyers v. Cole.
In Meyers, the two partners formed an oral
partnership to produce and sell advertisement
jingles. Meyers was responsible for the creation
of the jingles while Cole handled sales. During
the course of the partnership, Cole proposed that
the partnership expand the business to include
video footage with the jingles. This decision led
to a rift between the partners that culminated
with Meyers’ decision to make a “clean break”
from Cole. Subsequently, Meyers and Cole divided the partnership business equipment between themselves, but made no disposition of
the partnership name, customer list, or audio/
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video tapes containing edited music and commercials.
Meyers filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment as to the respective rights of the parties,
and Cole cross-claimed seeking a complete accounting. While the suit was pending and eight
months after Meyers’ split from Cole, Cole developed advertising using works created by
Meyers during the partnership. Despite Meyers’
protests, the trial court did not require Cole to
account for the income from these projects. Instead, the trial court found that Meyers breached
his fiduciary duty to the partnership by not sharing profits from jobs begun before dissolution
but completed afterward. Further, the court ordered that the audio/video tapes containing edited music and commercials be sold. The court
ordered that the proceeds be partitioned equally
between Meyers and Cole.
On appeal, Meyers raised two issues. The
first was whether the trial court erred in ruling
that Cole did not have to account for transactions
that occurred after dissolution but prior to termination involving commercial property developed
during the partnership. Under the UPA, a partnership of indefinite term may be dissolved by
the express will of a partner. However, dissolution does not terminate the partnership. The
partnership continues until winding-up is completed, which includes an accounting and distribution of the partnership assets. Until termina-
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tion, the interests of the partnership assets, profits, liabilities, and losses do not change whether
they exist at or occur after dissolution. Thus,
partnership transactions undertaken after dissolution but prior to termination must be included
in the partnership accounting.
Also, Meyers disagreed with the trial court’s
order to sell the tapes without first determining
who owned the copyrights to the jingles on the
tape. The trial court’s order implied that the
copyrights to the jingles were partnership property, which § 8 of the UPA defines as “[a]ll property originally brought into the partnership stock
or subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise, on account of the partnership . . ..” Consequently, if the tapes were partnership property,
the UPA required that they be sold and the proceeds distributed to the partners in accordance
with their interest in the partnership. Challenging the trial court’s order, Meyers argued that he,
as the author of the jingles, was the owner under
federal copyright law.
Copyrights are governed by the Copyright
Act of 1976 (beginning at 17 U.S.C. § 101), which
preempts state law. Under the Copyright Act,
two situations exist whereby the holder of a copyright is someone other than the creator of the
work. The first of these arises under the work
made for hire doctrine. This doctrine provides
that in the absence of a written agreement to the
contrary, an employer owns the copyright to a
work created by an employee in the course of
his employment. However, there is no indication that Congress intended to include partners
within the definition of employees. Thus, the
appellate court held that the work made for hire
doctrine does not apply to partners.
Where the work made for hire doctrine does
not apply, the copyright to a work rests in the
creator. The creator may transfer the copyright
by agreement. Such agreement is valid only if in
writing and signed by the owner. Therefore, an
oral agreement is insufficient to transfer ownership. Consequently, the appellate court held that,
in the absence of a contrary written agreement,
the copyright to a created work developed as
part of the partnership business rests in the creator, not the partnership. However, where multiple partners contribute to the development of
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the copyrighted property, they may be considered joint owners.
As Meyers illustrates, legal planning for a
partnership with intellectual property requires
consideration of issues not present in other partnerships. Chief among these issues is who owns
the copyright to the original material. Meyers
resolved the copyright ownership issue to the
extent that it found that copyrights vest in the
author, not the partnership, in the absence of a
written agreement to the contrary. However, it
is likely that multiple partners will contribute to
the creative process. In that situation, Meyers
does nothing to settle copyright disputes among
the individual partners. Where copyrightable
works are developed in the course of a
partnership’s business, a transactional lawyer
should advise his clients to avoid an oral partnership agreement and define the rights of each
partner in a written partnership agreement.
Joel Roettger

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Proposed Rule 1.13, Organizational Clients
Lawyers frequently represent corporations,
associations, partnerships, and other business organizations. In connection with its proposed revision of Tennessee’s Code of Professional Responsibility, the Tennessee Bar Association Committee for the Study of Standards of Professional
Conduct has recommended the adoption of a Rule
1.13 that will govern the lawyer’s relationship
with organizational clients. It is intended to address issues not currently addressed by way of
disciplinary rule in Tennessee’s Code of Professional Responsibility and to provide more guidance to lawyers than currently provided by Ethical Consideration 5-18. Addressing the Tennessee lawyer’s current obligations for representing
organizations, EC 5-18 states that
[a] lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes allegiance
to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative,
or other person connected with the entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer should
keep paramount its interests and the
lawyer’s professional judgment should not
be influenced by the personal desires of
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any person or organization. Occasionally
a lawyer for an entity is requested by a
stockholder, director, officer, employee,
representative, or other person connected
with the entity to represent that person in
an individual capacity; in such case the
lawyer may serve the individual only if
the lawyer is convinced that differing interests are not present.
Paragraph (A) of Proposed Rule 1.13 provides that the lawyer for an organization “represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.” Organizational constituents include officers, directors, employees, shareholders, and partners, among others. Commentary makes clear that a lawyer retained to represent an organization does not, absent a separate
agreement with the constituent, create an attorney-client relationship between the lawyer and
the constituent. The lawyer needs to explain to
the constituent that the lawyer represents the organization, not the constituent, if it becomes apparent that the constituent’s interests are adverse
to the organization’s.
A lawyer has a duty to protect the organizational client from constituent misconduct. Constituent misconduct consists of past, present, or
future conduct that violates a legal obligation to
the organization or violates a law in which the
conduct could be reasonably imputed to the organization. If the conduct is likely to result in
substantial injury to the client, the lawyer is required, upon knowledge of the misconduct, to
proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best
interest of the client.
Paragraph (B) does not mandate any specific remedial measures that must be taken.
Rather, it suggests a variety of factors and measures the lawyer should consider in deciding
which remedial measures are appropriate. The
factors include the seriousness of the misconduct
and the scope and nature of the attorney’s representation. Examples of measures the lawyer may
take include asking the client or constituent to
reconsider their conduct, advising the client to
obtain a separate legal opinion, and ultimately,
referring the matter to the highest authority in
the client organization. Ordinarily, the board of
directors, or in some cases, independent directors, constitute the corporation’s highest authorFall 1999

ity. The proposed rule requires the attorney to
minimize the disruption of the client and any risk
of breaching confidentiality.
If the highest authority in the client organization insists on conduct which is a clear violation of law and which is likely to result in substantial injury to the client, the proposed rule
allows the lawyer to resign. However, the lawyer must still maintain any client confidences after resigning.
Paragraph (E) provides that lawyers may
represent both the organizational client and any
of the constituents. Lawyers must remember, of
course, that the conflict of interest rules still apply.
The comments indicate that there may be
some situations in which a lawyer may jointly
represent a corporation and its directors in defense of a derivative action. However, when the
claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by
the board or the organization’s highest authority,
the conflict of interest rules may require the organization to use independent counsel in the derivative action.
Currently, Ethical Consideration 5-18 permits a lawyer to represent a constituent “only if
the lawyer is convinced that differing interests
are not present.” The proposed rule is consistent with the discussion of joint representation of
organizations and their constituents contained in
Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C.,
813 S.W.2d 400 (Tenn. 1991).
The proposed rule will serve to eliminate
ambiguity in the existing ethical standards because it details constituent misconduct and provides guidelines for dealing with the misconduct,
allowing resignation or withdrawal in extreme
cases. Clarity in the ethical standards will be
enhanced because the proposed rule identifies
requirements for dealing with and representing
constituents. The TBA’s Committee for the Study
of Standards of Professional Conduct is currently
reviewing comments and preparing a final version of the proposed rules. The full preliminary
draft is available on the TBA’s Internet web site
at http://www.tba.org/Committees/Conduct. Comments may still be made at the web site.
Thomas A. Kulaga
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ABA Formal Opinion 98-410, Lawyer Serving as Director of Client Corporation
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
do not prohibit a lawyer from serving as a director of a client corporation. However, while serving clients in a dual capacity, a lawyer should
address numerous ethical considerations. Formal
Opinion 98-410 provides general guidelines for
lawyers serving as directors on their client’s board
that will help minimize the risk of ethical violations.
The Committee divided the issues that arise
into three sections: (1) advising corporate management and the board when the lawyer acts in
a dual capacity, (2) protecting confidential information and privileges, and (3) confronting and
resolving issues that arise during the dual relationship. The Committee recognized that lawyers face different issues depending on the nature of the legal services provided, the nature of
the client’s business, and the nature of the lawyer’s
representation. The Committee meant for the
Formal Opinion to address general issues and
not the facts of every possible dual-relationship
scenario.
Ideally, the lawyer should communicate the
potential ethical and practical pitfalls of the dual
relationship with the corporation’s executives and
other board members before becoming a board
member. The lawyer should communicate conflict of interest concerns, the potential for confusion to ensue over what constitutes legal advice
or business advice, and the potential for a loss of
confidentiality or attorney-client privilege protection to these parties. The lawyer-director
should revisit this subject throughout the relationship if situations of potential conflict arise. A
written memorandum can clarify the lawyerdirector’s dual roles and the differences between
serving as a director and serving as counsel.
The scope of the attorney-client privilege
in the corporate setting is often construed to be
very limited. Some jurisdictions distinguish between purely legal advice and unprotected business advice. Because the lawyer is acting as a
director, communications between the lawyerdirector and other board members or corporate
executives may lose their protection. When management or the board consults the lawyer-direc-
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tor for legal advice, the lawyer-director should
make clear that the advice is purely legal. If
possible, another lawyer from the lawyerdirector’s firm should be present at a meeting to
provide legal advice. Following these procedures will provide the best support for privilege
protection and will alert those present to the confidential nature of the communications. The attorney-client privilege may be waived if the lawyer-director is perceived as acting as a director
rather than as counsel. The lawyer-director should
also be aware that the lawyer-director’s actions
could be imputed to the corporation if she is
acting as a director and that the lawyer-director
has the same fiduciary obligations to third parties
as other directors.
The Committee addressed four potential ethical issues that may arise during the course of the
dual relationship and what actions the lawyer
may take to avoid these violations. The issues
addressed were (1) serving as counsel in a matter that the lawyer-director opposed as director,
(2) opining on past board actions in which the
lawyer-director participated, (3) acting as a director in corporate actions affecting the lawyerdirector as a lawyer, and (4) representing the
corporation in certain types of litigation.
When a corporation decides to pursue an
objective that the lawyer-director opposed as a
director, the lawyer-director must determine
whether her representation would be materially
limited by her opposing view. If the lawyerdirector determines that representation will not
be adversely affected and the client consents to
the lawyer-director’s continued representation, the
lawyer-director’s representation may continue.
However, the lawyer-director may be well advised to suggest that a lawyer from a different
firm should represent the corporation in the matter. There is a risk that, if the lawyer-director
must withdraw as the lawyer, the lawyer-director’s
firm may also be required to withdraw. In this
situation, the lawyer may need to resign from
the board. The lawyer-director needs to be aware
that a non-consentable conflict of interest may
arise.
Certain situations may arise when the board
asks a lawyer-director to provide advice concerning prior decisions of the board in which the
lawyer-director participated as a director. SeekFall 1999
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ing a waiver of conflict would be problematic
because the lawyer-director was directly concerned with the question raised. The lawyerdirector may be unable to provide independent
judgment in some cases. This problem could
possibly be mitigated by the participation of other
counsel.
A conflict issue may also arise when the
board considers actions which will affect the lawyer-director’s firm. The lawyer-director’s independent judgment as a director then comes into
question. The lawyer-director should consider
recusing from any decisions involving the pecuniary interests of the firm. A prudent lawyerdirector should, at a minimum, abstain from voting as a director on issues that will directly involve the corporation’s relationship with the lawyer-director’s law firm. A lawyer-director would
not violate any Model Rules for participating in
corporate action that resulted in the corporation
employing the lawyer-director’s law firm.
If the corporation, its directors, and its officers become defendants in litigation, ethical issues arise when one of the board members is a
lawyer in the representing law firm. If there are
potential conflicts between the corporation and
its directors, cross-claims are filed, or a controversy arises between the corporation and its lawyers, indirectly conflicting interests may require
independent representation. Finally, prior representation of the corporation may prevent the
firm from representing its own member under
Model Rules 1.9(a) and 1.1(a).
The Committee suggested that the lawyerdirector should:
Ensure that management and the board of
directors understand the differences between the
lawyer-director’s role as a director and as a lawyer, that the lawyer-director represents only the
corporate entity, and that conflicts of interest may
force the lawyer-director to recuse as director or
require independent counsel or co-counsel to represent the corporation in some matters.
•

Ensure that the management and the board
of directors understand the potential limits of the
attorney-client privilege when the lawyer acts as
both lawyer and director.
•
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Recuse herself as director when the relationship of the lawyer-director’s firm and the corporation is under consideration.
•

Consistently maintain a lawyer’s independent professional judgment, recommending
against unethical or illegal courses of action.
•

Represent the client corporation zealously,
even when the lawyer-director disagrees with
the course of action, unless that course involves
fraudulent or criminal conduct, self-dealing, or
would otherwise violate the Model Rules.
•

Decline any representation as counsel when
the lawyer-director’s interests conflict with the
lawyer-director’s ability to represent the corporation competently and diligently.
•

Emily B. Holloway

REAL ESTATE
Keith Hardware, Inc. v. White, 956 S.W.2d
500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997), cert. denied,
(Dec. 1, 1997)
As the retail landscape shifts to a “one-stop”
shopping strategy, restrictive covenants in shopping center leases will continue to be important
to landlords, tenants, and shoppers. First, for
landlords, these restrictive covenants work to
entice potential tenants to sign leases but may
preclude these landlords from accepting future
tenants that sell similar merchandise. Second,
for tenants, restrictive covenants give a certain
amount of security because tenants know that
they will not have large-scale, direct competition
in the immediate vicinity. Finally, for shoppers,
restrictive covenants provide less of an opportunity to comparison-shop in the immediate vicinity and may require multiple stops to obtain the
best price and selection on the desired merchandise.
In Keith Hardware, the Tennessee Court of
Appeals for the Eastern Section considered
whether a restrictive covenant in a shopping center lease was too broad to be enforceable. The
plaintiff operated a retail hardware store as a
tenant in the defendants’ shopping center. A
lease agreement clause provided that the plaintiff would have the “exclusive and sole right” to
operate a store, the principal business of which
was the sale of an enumerated list of items. The
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clause provided that no other retail tenant in the
center could have the sale of any enumerated
item as its principal business, and it limited sales
of the enumerated items by each retail tenant to
a maximum of 25% of its total sales. The defendants subsequently rented space to two retailers
who may have violated this provision and the
plaintiff sued for injunctive relief. The court of
appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the
injunction and remanded.
Since no prior Tennessee decisions addressed
the issue, the court of appeals looked to the law
of other jurisdictions. Other states have found
restrictive covenants enforceable only if they are
reasonable in effect and scope.
First, the court found that the clause was
reasonable in effect because it affected only one
shopping center, and the plaintiff was reasonable in wanting to avoid competition within the
center. The court reasoned that the clause would
not adversely affect the public interest where
there are several available shopping centers in a
community. Second, the court found that the
clause was reasonable in scope even though the
clause contained a rather lengthy list of items
that other stores were restricted from carrying in
significant amounts. While the list of goods was
long, it clarified ambiguities that courts might otherwise find difficult to interpret. Because the list
was limited to items that provided significant
portions of the plaintiff’s sales, the clause was
not overly broad in scope and was enforceable.
This case upholds the validity of covenants
in commercial leases that reasonably restrict competition. The decision is likely to result in a
proliferation of the “exclusive list” type of restrictive covenant in commercial leases. Drafters
should list the specific items affected by this type
of covenant because courts may be less willing
to give broad meanings to vague terms, and drafters should also restrict covenants to a narrow
geographical area.
Michael S. McKinney

SECURITIES
Rubin v. Schottenstein, 143 F.3d 263 (6th
Cir. 1998)
In Rubin v. Schottenstein, the 6th Circuit, in
an en banc decision, addressed legal issues of
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considerable importance to lawyers who represent buyers or sellers in connection with the sale
of securities. The court addressed the extent of
the personal liability of a seller’s attorney for
violation of Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act. The court also considered the
extent to which a buyer’s cause of action may be
defeated because the buyer’s lawyer relied upon
the statements made by the seller’s lawyer.
Medical Designs, Inc. (MDI), a financially
troubled corporation, was in default on its principal source of financing, a line of credit with Star
Bank. Under their credit agreement, any further
investment in the company would cause a material breach and would constitute an event of default with the bank. Yet, MDI sought to raise
additional capital by issuing notes and shares to
two investors, Robert Rubin and James Cohen.
MDI retained Attorney Richard Barnhart, a partner with Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, to render a
legal opinion in connection with their transaction
that would be limited to questions as to whether
MDI possessed the power to seek further investment. MDI also asked that the letter address
whether the investors’ note was authorized, executed, and delivered by MDI and whether it
was enforceable against MDI. Rubin and Cohen
were represented in the transaction by their lawyer, Stephen Weiss.
In response to inquiries by the investors and
their attorney about MDI’s financial condition and
its relationship to Star Bank, MDI referred the
investors to Barnhart. In conversations with Rubin
and Cohen and again with Weiss, Barnhart incorrectly told the investors that there was no problem with the company’s relationship with the bank.
Further, Barnhart responded that in his opinion
the relationship with the bank was fine and that
Star Bank would increase its funding to MDI after Rubin’s investment. For purposes of its decision, the court assumed that at no time did
Barnhart reveal what he knew about the
company’s actual relationship with the bank, such
as the fact that MDI was already in default or
that the granting of a security interest would also
constitute an event of default. Lastly, Barnhart
stressed to Rubin, Cohen, and Weiss that there
was no need to contact the Bank as part of the
investor’s due diligence.
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Following these conversations, neither the
investors nor their attorney contacted Star Bank
to confirm the accuracy of Barnhart’s statements;
rather, they proceeded to purchase the notes and
shares. Shortly thereafter, Star Bank froze MDI’s
account and declared the line of credit in default.
MDI declared bankruptcy, resulting in Rubin and
Cohen losing their entire investment. They filed
suit against Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn and
Barnhart, alleging that Barnhart violated § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio granted summary judgment for the attorney, Barnhart. On appeal, a divided panel affirmed the summary judgment, holding that
Barnhart had no affirmative duty to disclose information, and to the extent that Barnhart misrepresented the circumstances, Rubin and Cohen
had not reasonably relied on Barnhart’s representations.
Upon a rehearing en banc, the Sixth Circuit
vacated the previous decision and held that liability under Rule 10b-5 arises when an attorney
is a “primary participant.” The court identified
two possible avenues for attorney liability as a
primary participant under Rule 10b-5. An attorney participating in a securities transaction owes
no duty under Rule 10b-5 to the opposing party
unless the attorney (1) assumes the affirmative
duty to provide information or (2) undertakes to
provide information with respect to the transaction. In this case, Barnhart had assumed no duty
to provide information to Rubin and Cohen beyond what he agreed to provide in the legal
opinion. Such information did not relate to the

relationship between MDI and Star Bank; therefore, there was no omission in the opinion.
However, when an attorney undertakes to
speak on matters outside the scope of the legal
opinions the attorney agreed to provide, the law
imposes a duty to speak truthfully and to provide all the information necessary to prevent the
statements made from being misleading. Barnhart
assumed such a duty when he chose to speak
with the investors about MDI’s financial relations
with Star Bank. Though outside the scope of his
legal duty to speak, Barnhart’s failure to disclose
MDI’s default created a misleading picture of the
relationship between MDI and the bank, and thus
created liability.
Although the court acknowledged that there
could be circumstances in which an attorney could
be held liable for remaining silent in a securities
transaction, the court emphasized that Barnhart’s
liability was premised on the fact that he undertook to make representations about the financial
relationship and failed to provide the information necessary to prevent the statement from being misleading.
The court then proceeded to reject Barnhart’s
argument that the plaintiff could not recover because the plaintiff did not act reasonably due to
their attorney’s failure to investigate. With respect to Barnhart’s omissions, the court held, consistent with prevailing authority, that there is a
presumption of reliance. All that the plaintiff
must establish is that (1) facts were withheld,
and that (2) those facts would be considered material to a reasonable investor. For purposes of
the motion for summary judgment, the court re-
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jected Barnhart’s attempt to rebut the presumption by claiming that the investors or their counsel could have sought confirmation from the bank.
With respect to Barnhart’s misrepresentations,
the court held that the investors were not reckless in relying on the representation made by the
seller’s counsel. In a misrepresentation scenario,
the test is whether there is absence of recklessness. If there is no special knowledge of the
facts misrepresented, no actual access to information that would reveal fraud, and no personal
knowledge of the seller, then neither the investor nor the investor’s attorney are deemed reckless in relying upon the seller’s attorney’s statements. In the present case, the court held that
the investors held no special knowledge, and
indeed asked for further information through probing questions. However, the court did note that
perhaps in transactions that involve larger sums
of money, such as millions of dollars, the due
diligence of the investors might be under closer
scrutiny.
Finally, in response to claims by Barnhart,
the court refused to exempt lawyers from the
duties imposed by Rule 10b-5 on all participants
in securities transactions. The court noted that if
misrepresentation by a participating attorney is
related to law, it may be unreasonable for the
buyer’s lawyer to rely on the representations of
the seller. However, the court determined that
the investors were not unreasonable for relying
on representations of fact. The court rejected
the holding of the panel opinion, which suggested that the representation of investors by a
lawyer affects the extent to which the investors
are able to rely on the statements made by the
sellers or their counsel. Again, the en banc court
did not include any special treatment for attorneys.
Rubin is important because it is one of the
first cases to address lawyer liability for Rule
10b-5 violations since the Supreme Court held
that attorneys are not liable for aiding or abetting
in securities transactions. Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). The essential point in Rubin is that a court will only
deem a seller’s lawyer a “primary participant” if
the lawyer assumed a duty to speak, or elected
to speak to participants in the transaction.
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In light of Rubin, attorneys for sellers should
be aware of the need to be forthcoming with
information when they assume a duty to speak,
as for example, they do whey they agree to render a third party legal opinion related to the transaction. This duty, however, only applies to subjects about which the attorney has agreed to render an opinion. Although an attorney may decide that it is unwise to speak on behalf of a
client on matters beyond the scope of the representation, attorneys who choose to speak are on
notice that they must be accurate and must provide information necessary to prevent the statement from being misleading.
Rubin also serves to alert lawyers who are
representing purchasers of securities to reflect
on the extent to which they may rely on representations made to them by sellers. The court
suggested that it may be inappropriate to rely on
seller’s counsel about matters of law, but seems
to suggest that, otherwise, lawyers are as free as
any participant to rely on representations made
by sellers’ counsel. Under Rubin, the law will
not impose a different standard for lawyers regarding lawyers’ reliance on information of fact.
James C. Cotey

T AX
Hutton v. Johnson, 956 S.W.2d 484 (Tenn.
1997)
Frequently, taxpayers will trade or exchange
their old property when purchasing new or replacement property for their businesses. Section
1031 of the Internal Revenue Code allows deferral of any gain on the disposal of the traded
property for certain qualifying exchanges. Also,
Tennessee will allow a reduction in the use tax
base for the value of any property traded for the
newly purchased property. In Hutton, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether a Tennessee resident was required to pay use tax on
the full value of an aircraft he purchased or if he
could reduce the tax to reflect the value of an
aircraft he sold to fund the purchase. The sale
and purchase were part of a purported “deferred
§ 1031” exchange. See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (1997).
Hutton, the taxpayer, sold an aircraft to Bell
Aircraft, Inc., under an agreement in which the
buyer agreed to purchase and transfer to Hutton
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a replacement aircraft to be identified by Hutton.
Pending the identification, Bell Aircraft placed
the net purchase price in an escrow account. If
Hutton failed to identify an aircraft within a stated
time, he was absolutely entitled to the escrowed
funds. Within the appropriate time, Hutton identified the replacement aircraft, but Hutton, rather
than Bell Aircraft, executed the agreement to
purchase the aircraft from an out-of-state seller.
Bell Aircraft released the escrowed funds, which
were used to satisfy a portion of the purchase
obligation under the agreement.
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I.R.C. § 1031 exchange cannot involve a trade
because the seller in the deferred purchase typically receives only cash and the deferred purchase is not contingent on the earlier sale. In
contrast, a properly-structured, simultaneous
three-party § 1031 exchange should involve a
trade because the seller’s transfer will be contingent on his or her receipt of the like-kind property.
Jason E. Havens

Tennessee law governed the transaction
between Hutton and Bell Aircraft. A Tennessee
resident must pay a 6-percent use tax on the
personal property he or she purchases in another state but uses in Tennessee. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 67-6-203(a) (1996). Although the tax is
generally based on the value of the purchased
property, that base is reduced by (or credited
with) the value of any property traded for the
purchased property. Id. § 67-6-510(a).
Because Hutton purchased the new aircraft
outside Tennessee but used the aircraft in Tennessee, he was obligated to pay use tax on that
purchase. Further, Hutton had to pay the tax on
the full value of the new aircraft because, the
court concluded, Hutton did not trade his old aircraft for the new aircraft. The court reached that
conclusion because (1) neither transaction was
dependent on the completion of the other and
(2) the seller of the new aircraft received the full
purchase price in cash.
At trial, Hutton produced some documents
that purported to assign his interest in the purchase agreement to Bell Aircraft. The seller,
however, limited assignments under the agreement, and the court apparently gave the assignment no legal effect. Additionally, because Hutton
used the funds to satisfy a portion of his purchase obligation for the new aircraft, he should
be treated as if he received those funds and I.R.C.
§ 1031(a)(3) should not apply to the sale and
exchange. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(f) (1991).
Hutton offers insight for the transactional
attorney in structuring such an exchange to
achieve the client’s desired tax results. Although
not altogether clear from the opinion, it appears
that the court would find that the typical deferred
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Starting a Business Practice
Bradley H. Hodge*

INTRODUCTION
“Are you crazy? Do you really want to start
your own firm? You should go back to the established law firm – where you belong,” exclaimed
one of my good friends. “Don’t you know that
you have a wife and family to feed?” remarked
one of the partners at an established law firm.
Another friend and colleague stated, “Well, if you
don’t have enough food, come over and we’ll
feed you.”
When I made the decision to begin a small
general business practice, I felt as if I were standing at the precipice with everyone anticipating
that I would fall to my professional death. Although I felt like the first person to face this
experience, the majority of attorneys in the United
States work as solo practitioners or in small firms
such as the one that my partner and I started. 1
Lawyers who do not practice solo or in small
firms often find themselves considering the op* The author graduated with high honors from
The University of Tennessee College of Law in 1989.
He was elected to the Order of the Coif. Upon
graduation, he clerked for one year for the Honorable
John Y. Powers at the United States District Court in
Chattanooga. He then returned to Knoxville to practice
as an associate at Gentry, Tipton, Kizer & Little, P.C.,
where he focused on general corporate and business
law, bankruptcy, and business litigation. Subsequently,
he clerked at the United States District Court for the
Honorable James H. Jarvis, II. He has since returned to
Gentry, Tipton as a partner after operating his own firm
for about one-and-one-half years. His firm provided a
transition from his clerkship, a valuable basis to return
to his former employer as a partner, and an entrepreneurial adventure.
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tion. In addition to those with a budding entrepreneurial spirit, many lawyers are forced to do
so by employment conditions of the times.
Downsizing by large firms, government, and corporations, as well as competition among the great
numbers of new law school graduates, continually act to push more lawyers into opening their
own firms or working for small practices.2 There
are approximately 900,000 lawyers in the United
States, with law schools producing over 35,000
new lawyers each year. 3 The Bureau of Labor
Statistics recently predicted that there will be 28
percent more lawyers by the year 2005. 4 Thus,
while healthy competition can be expected today, it can only become more fierce in the future.
Before I started my firm in July 1997, I spent
five-and-one-half years working as a law clerk
in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee. I had practiced business
law with a large firm before joining the Court;
The author would like to thank Jason E. Havens, a
student at The University of Tennessee College of Law,
for his help in researching many of the sections in this
article and providing helpful suggestions on style and
content.
1
Theodore M. Becker, The Small Law Firm
Revolution: The World Is Getting Smaller, So Should
Law Firms, MERRILL’S ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1996, at 8,
available in WL ALLNEWSPLUS database.
2
Cara Jepsen, Small Law Firms Rule: More Legal
Eagles Flying Solo, CRAIN’S SMALL BUS.-C HI., Nov. 1, 1996,
at 28, available in WL ALLNEWSPLUS database.
3
Ward Bower, Keys to Success, and Things that
the Small Firm Can Do to Survive and Thrive, O R. ST .
BAR BULL., May 1997, at 33, available in WL JLR database.

Fall 1999

Transactions TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

28

however, a long time had passed between my
experience with the large firm and my new practice. I had not been exposed to extensive client
contact during the interim. The information in
this article is based on the information which I
voraciously began to study only a few months
before I left my job with the Court. The tips are
very practical, focusing on the various aspects of
planning and the early operation of a business
practice.
For most lawyers, starting a law firm can be
difficult and risky. This reality offered a challenge for me as well, but my firm succeeded as
a venture and provided valuable clients who are
still an important part of my practice. I welcome
the opportunity to share my experiences with
other small firm lawyers and solo practitioners,
including those who may be contemplating a small
business law practice.
TOWARD QUALITY
Finding clients and generating business–rainmaking–are crucial. Rainmaking should emphasize both quality and performance of the firm.
These attributes, if perceived by clients and other
lawyers, will inevitably lead to a successful practice.
In any area of practice, especially a business practice, the client will ultimately judge the
lawyer by what is accomplished, not by what is
promised.5 Consequently, if you keep the client’s
welfare and not just your own at heart, your practice will necessarily become more productive
and, hence, more profitable. Stated another way,
if, as a small business lawyer, you constantly assess how you can add value to your clients’ businesses, then their increased ability to compete
and their productivity will ultimately translate into
more profit for you. The best way to implement
this strategy is to view yourself as a partner with
your business clients. Thus, as the clients’ businesses grow, so will the clients’ need for legal
Francis H. Musselman, Developing a ClientOriented Law Practice, N.Y. ST. BAR J., May/June 1997,
at 20.
4

5

DANIEL B. KENNEDY, LAW FIRM MARKETING: SUCCESS-
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services. The goal is to make yourself more
valuable to your clients than any other attorney
can be.
According to a national survey of why clients leave,
• 1% die,
• 3% move,
• 5% dislike the lawyer’s work product,
• 24% have some dispute which is not
resolved, and
• 67% leave because they feel they were
treated discourteously, indifferently, or
simply were not given good service. 6
With the increase in competition among lawyers generally, business lawyers must continue
to learn exactly what the client wants. The most
often cited reasons for client satisfaction include,
in order of importance, “lawyer accessibility, accurate cost estimates, good value, clear pricing
policies, and timeliness.” 7
The business lawyer just starting a practice
should not have much trouble providing lawyer
accessibility. If a lawyer treats clients as individuals and cultivates personal relationships, the
clients will perceive and appreciate the fact that
the lawyer will be there to help.
The importance of cost estimates cannot be
overstated, especially for a small business practitioner. Small firms can provide a cost advantage
to clients, while demonstrating the ability to provide the same level of service and expertise as a
larger firm. The key for a small firm is to concentrate on the particular needs of the prospective client and show the ability to serve those
needs. The “hands on” approach of small firm
lawyers and their responsiveness to client needs
translate into greater efficiencies in representation and overall value.
A simple way to emphasize the cost advantage of a small firm or solo business practitioner
PRACTICE 34 (1994).
JAY FOONBERG, HOW TO START & BUILD A SUCCESSFUL
LAW PRACTICE 134 (3d ed. 1991).
6

7

Barbara Hagenbaugh, What Clients Want, BU S.
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is to make a habit of providing a cost estimate
every time the client brings business. A cost
estimate shifts the focus from billing to rendering
service to the client. 8
Another indicator of client satisfaction is the
number of referrals received. As with any service provider, the biggest single source of business should be referrals from acquaintances and
other professionals. Of course, to receive referrals from other attorneys, you must cultivate a
good reputation and acquire technical skill and
knowledge in your chosen areas of concentration. Credibility is your stock in trade. If you
conduct yourself in the highest traditions of the
bar at all times; practice in an honest, ethical,
professional, and technically-proficient way; and
show that you care about your clients, then you
will earn the respect of your professional colleagues. With respect will come referrals. 9
Other lawyers will recognize whether you
maintain these high standards and whether you
offer quality work in a timely manner. When I
look for an attorney to refer a case, I consider
only those whom I would trust to handle the
case if I were the client.
As a check, all lawyers, especially business
lawyers, should always assess whether the client
had a positive experience dealing with the firm.
One way to assess performance in this category
is through the use of client and performance evaluations. Although it may be difficult to subject
yourself to criticism in this way, it is probably
the most effective way to gear your practice toward the needs and expectations of business clients.
There are no shortcuts to obtaining the necessary skills to practice in any area of the law,
including business law practice. You should be
willing to work hard to learn more about the
field than others who practice in the same area.
One approach is to spend at least one hour a day
L. TODAY, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 23, 24.
See Brett C. Don, Implementing Task-Based
Billing: A Law Firm Perspective, TENN. B AR J., July/Aug.
1997, at 25.
8

Sheldon J. Stark, Responsible Rainmaking: How
to Build Your Practice, TRIAL, Jan. 1996, at 57, 58.
9

10

Tenn. Bar Assoc. TBALink, <http://www.tba.org/>.
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acquiring expertise in your chosen field. I know
of one local lawyer with a negligence defense
practice who begins each morning with a review
of all reported appellate court opinions. He accesses these opinions through the TBA Link
Internet homepage, an on-line service of the Tennessee Bar Association. 10 Numerous web sources
provide business information. 1 1 Two free e-mail
services are Law Journal Express Corporate Express and Tennessee Opinions from TBALink
Opinion Flash. 1 2 These services send periodic
e-mail messages, free of charge, with information on current news and cases.
In any area of practice, a lawyer should
never stop searching for knowledge, never discount any source as a possible source of information, and always look for ways in which knowledge can be tested by interaction with other lawyers.
Another “skill” a business lawyer should
have is a general understanding of business. All
too often, clients encounter business lawyers who,
surprisingly, lack an understanding of business.
This shortcoming is sometimes reflected by lawyers who are too cautious, advising their clients
to operate only by the letter of the law, without
allowing their clients to take financial risks, which
are vital to the business world. Although lawyers from all backgrounds may be competent,
those with a history of non-law related business
experience seem to understand the particular
needs of the client in a business law practice.
For example, my father and grandfather owned
and operated grocery stores. They allowed me
to work in those businesses from a very young
age, and I saw first-hand the unique needs of the
entrepreneur. Because I intended to pursue a
legal career and I believed that a better understanding of business would assist me in my practice, I obtained a minor in business administration as an undergraduate student.
An excellent starting point for gaining exposure
to nearly any area of law is FindLaw’s web site at
<http://www.findlaw.com/>. Because the site is
organized by topic, legal research is simplified.
11

Law Journal Express Corporate Express <http:/
/www.ljx.com/corpcounselor/express/>; Tennessee
Opinions from TBALink Opinion Flash <http://
www.tba.org/>.
12
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Finally, perhaps the best way to show a
business client that you understand business needs
and care about the client’s business is to learn
that client’s business. Make a habit of visiting
the client regularly, tour the plant, and get to
know the managers and employees. This experience will provide a better understanding of the
business for purposes of delivering legal services. 1 3
COUNTING THE COST
Once you have made the commitment to
quality and performance, you need to count the
costs of starting and operating the law practice.
These costs have escalated dramatically in recent years. 14 The demands of creating a new
law firm will tax your entrepreneurial skills, business acumen, and personal relationships. A small
law firm is like a marriage: its success depends
on the members’ willingness to work together,
make decisions, and compromise when necessary. 1 5
When I ventured out, I had to weigh what I
wanted from my practice against the capital resources needed and the dramatically increased
risk in starting a firm. I had to assess sources of
available cash, the cost of office property, and
even the depth of my skills and the ability to
acquire those skills.
For those intending to concentrate on business practice, it is very helpful to talk to business
executives,
other
lawyers
and
judges, accountants, and, for lack of a better descriptive term, the community “movers” and
“shakers.” Of course, you must always keep
your ultimate goals for starting a practice at the
fore. Otherwise, you run the risk of becoming
confused or too fearful to make the move.
My partner and I decided that we should
commit to the areas of practice which we enjoyed and really wanted to pursue. I realized
early on that I did not want to practice “door
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law,” taking virtually anything that walked through
the door. I wanted to focus my practice on business-related matters, including business planning,
transactional law, employment law, and general
business litigation. For example, while practicing in our firm, I created corporations for small
businesses and counseled clients on their choice
of business entity. During the first month of our
practice, I represented the buyer in a stock-purchase acquisition of a business established in 1923.
During that same month, I drafted employment
agreements for sales representatives and other
key employees, including covenants not-to-compete and “golden parachute” agreements.
I cannot emphasize enough the need to reject the temptation to take cases in the hopes of
squeezing out a fee simply because you perceive you must have something to do. Learn to
say “no.” As a small business lawyer, I “specialize” by exclusion. That is, I limit my practice by
identifying the types of matters or clients that I
will not accept.
Similarly, solo practitioners and small firms
must also learn to say “no” to clients who are
either unwilling or unable to pay a fee. Early
qualification of clients should occur by fee counseling, engagement letters, and fee memos, all
of which should clearly spell out the client’s obligations. There is little, if any, risk in doing this.
The client who goes elsewhere is the one who
would be unlikely to pay the bill in the first
place. Instead of wasting resources serving the
non-paying client, you can better spend your time
developing clients who are willing and able to
pay.
FLYING UNDER THE MARKETING RADAR16
To date (and probably for the foreseeable
future), business lawyers have resisted “hawking” their services on television or even in yellow page ads. As any veteran practitioner knows,
however, marketing is a substantial key to success for small law firms.

13

Bower, supra note 3, at 35.

GETTING STARTED: BASICS FOR A SUCCESSFUL LAW FIRM,
(Arthur G. Greene ed. 1996).
14
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When we began planning our practice in
Farragut, Tennessee, my partner and I developed
a simple marketing strategy, amounting to no more
than a few tasteful ways to make our names and
firm known in the Knoxville community. We
decided to make announcement cards an integral
part of our marketing plan. Having worked in
the Federal District Court, I developed relationships with numerous lawyers who had no interest in transactional or general business law. These
lawyers responded to our announcements by referring a steady source of business to our firm.
Although my partner was the full-time litigator, I
was retained as East Tennessee counsel for a
large multi-national company, representing it in
commercial and products liability litigation, all as
a result of a referral from another firm. I was
also retained by a referred bank client, which
has resulted in several commercial financing
projects.
The changing nature of the practice of law,
which in no small way has been driven by
changes in technology, demands that small law
firms respond. Because clients want to know
that firms are on the technological cutting edge,
investment in technology is a competitive requirement in today’s marketplace. Developing
an Internet web site addresses this reality. Our
web site proved to be a crucial component of
our practice and our marketing.
Given the exploding Internet climate, we
determined that our web site should be detailed
and interactive, offering numerous links to legal
resources for both the lawyer and the non-lawyer. The address for the site was listed on our
business cards, our letterhead, and even our
announcement cards. We averaged around 1,500
visitors per month and received numerous inquiries and several clients from the web pages.
Other lawyers seemed to be the most frequent
visitors, possibly because of the exhaustive links
to resources we included on the site. Having
lawyers visit our web pages was simply another
way to keep our firm in the minds of other lawyers for potential referrals.
Lawyers often boast of their institutional business clients, implying that they provide services
only to the biggest and best; however, statistics
15
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belie the boast. “[A]pproximately 97 percent or
more of all businesses qualify as ‘small businesses.’” 1 7 Naturally, a portion of our web site
discussed small and family business issues.
The use of electronic mail also showed that
our firm was responsive to technological advances. This proved to be a useful tool for sending drafts of contracts to my clients for review,
as well as for other tasks. I began the process of
establishing strategic on-line alliances with other
practitioners in order to better serve clients. The
level of computerization for the new business
practice is a very important part of the practical,
philosophical, and of course, financial requirements of the practice. Fortunately, my partner
and I shared values on this issue and used technology in our marketing efforts.
Lastly, our firm intended to develop an office brochure, which, in many respects, already
existed on-line. The office brochure should be
consistent with the firm’s vision and the image
that it wants to promote. For the business lawyer, the brochure should highlight the practice
areas which will service or appeal to small businesses.
Our total marketing plan included passive
advertising, in the form of brochures, pamphlets,
and the web site; community and public relations efforts ranging from actively participating
in chambers of commerce to sponsoring youth
baseball teams; and client relations improvements.
A major focus was on improving the quality of
services delivered to clients and the cost-effectiveness of those services.
CONCLUSION
Many aspects of the practice of law have
changed significantly in the past decade, especially lawyers’ increased reliance on automation.
However, the requirement for success has not
changed: it is still hard work. Law is not an easy
business, particularly for lawyers in small firms.
However, a willingness to work hard and work
smart will inevitably result in a successful business law practice, and contrary to the pessimistic
popular belief, there will always be food to eat.

Id.
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Liquidated Damage Clauses
Cheryl A. Davis

Parties to a contract have the option to include in their agreement a provision that specifies an amount payable for loss they expect may
be suffered by one of the parties due to breach.
The agreement may also state that, in the event
of default, one party will forfeit specified rights
to which they would otherwise be entitled, such
as rights under a promissory note associated with
the transaction or a right to restitution of sums
previously advanced in connection with the transaction. 1 Such provisions are commonly called
liquidated damage clauses.
Liquidated damage clauses serve a useful
purpose in business transactions. They provide
certainty where damages are uncertain and not
easily proven. This certainty affords protection
to both parties to a contract—protection to the
promisee from damages caused by unsatisfactory performance, and assurance to the promisor
that his liability is defined and limited in the event
that he does not meet his contractual obligations.
Moreover, adjusting for damages in advance, at a
time when parties are amicable and relatively
reasonable, promotes equitable dealing and
prompt resolution of disputes. This is generally
preferable to judicial resolution of the dispute at
a time when the relationship between the parties is strained and they have assumed an
adversarial posture.

* Cheryl A. Davis is a third-year student at the
University of Tennessee College of Law.
In general, a forfeiture is a “divestiture of
specific property without compensation; it imposes a
loss on a party by the taking away of some preexisting
1
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Liquidated damage clauses must be carefully drafted. Both parties, of course, must be
able to understand their obligations in the event
of breach. Moreover, liquidated damage clauses
must represent a good faith effort to estimate the
actual harm caused by default. Courts will not
enforce damages clauses where the parties’ intent is to penalize the breacher. Lawyers drafting liquidated damage clauses, then, must be familiar with the general legal principles that courts
in their jurisdiction use when they determine
whether or not to enforce a liquidated damage
provision. The lawyer should understand what
factual circumstances have prompted courts to
invalidate such clauses in the past. It is the purpose of this essay to alert Tennessee lawyers to
case law of which they should be aware prior to
drafting contracts and advising clients regarding
liquidated damage clauses.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
When faced with a challenge to a liquidated damage clause, Tennessee courts, like courts
in most jurisdictions, focus on reasonableness;
they examine whether the stipulated amount was
the result of an honest effort by the parties to
reasonably anticipate the actual harm caused by
default. “If the [contract damage] provision is a
reasonable estimate of the damages that would

valid right without compensation.” Directed toward
contract law, a forfeiture is “the deprivation or destruction of a right in consequence of the nonperformance
of some obligation or condition.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
449 (6th ed. 1990).
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occur from a breach, then the provision is normally construed as an enforceable stipulation for
liquidated damages.” 2 On the other hand, if the
clause is designed as a penalty, to effectively
coerce performance by punishing a breach, courts
will invalidate the clause as a matter of public
policy.
There is a split of authority as to whether
the courts should use a prospective method or
retrospective method, or both, to evaluate reasonableness for determining whether a liquidated
damages provision constitutes a penalty. Under
the prospective approach, a court will consider
“whether the liquidated sum was a reasonable
estimate of potential damages and whether actual damages were indeterminable or difficult to
measure at the time the parties entered into the
contract.” 3 Damages that are predictable at the
time the parties are formulating their agreement,
or those which the parties are certain would be
easily calculable at the time of breach, are not
subject to liquidation in a contract. When the
liquidated damages provision satisfies those two
factors and reflects the parties’ intentions to compensate the injured party, then ordinarily the provision will be upheld as a reasonable agreement
for liquidated damages. 4 In a prospective analysis, the amount of actual damages suffered by
the nonbreaching party is immaterial to granting
recovery. Using a retrospective approach, however, a court may refuse to enforce a liquidated
damage clause if the contractually specified damages would be “grossly disproportionate” to the
actual damages suffered as a result of the breach.5
The major difference between the retrospective
and prospective approaches is timing: whether
V.L. Nicholson Co. v. Transcon Investment and
Financial Ltd., Inc., 595 S.W.2d 474, 484 (Tenn. 1980).
2

Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 100-01
(Tenn. 1999).
3

4

Id. at 100.

See e.g., Beasley v. Horrell, 864 S.W. 2d 45, 48
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)
5

Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 100 (emphasis added).
This approach “incorporates the cardinal rule of contract
interpretation, requiring courts to ascertain the intentions of the parties based upon the language in the
contract.” Id. at 100 n.12.
6
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the court evaluates the reasonableness of the
stipulated damage amount from the view of the
parties at the time of contract signing or after the
breach occurred.
This question remained unsettled in Tennessee until June 1999, when the Tennessee Supreme Court decided in Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc.
that Tennessee courts “must focus on the intentions of the parties based upon the language in
the contract and the circumstances that existed at
the time of contract formation.” 6 The prospective approach is now the proper method for determining whether a liquidated damages provision is a penalty in Tennessee. Prior to Guiliano,
several Courts of Appeals had refused to enforce
liquidated damage clauses that called for damages which were grossly disproportionate to the
actual damages sustained. 7 The Supreme Court,
however, concluded that there were “inherent
problems with retrospective analysis” and expressly rejected this method. The court reasoned
that a prospective approach was “the better rule”
based upon two important interests which surfaced in the Guiliano case: (1) the freedom of
parties to bargain for and agree to mutually acceptable terms (such as liquidated damages) without interference from outside observers; and (2)
the limitations set by public policy. 8 Respecting
freedom to contract, the court concluded that a
retrospective approach undermined important
benefits of contract negotiations, including certainty and risk allocation, thereby defeating the
purpose of agreeing to damages in advance.9
Moreover, efficient dispute resolution is not promoted when supposedly resolved matters can
be dredged up via litigation. At the same time,
See Harmon v. Eggers, 699 S.W.2d 159, 163
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), overruled by Guiliano v. Cleo,
Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn. 1999); Eller Bros., Inc., v.
Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc., 623 S.W.2d 624, 628
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), overruled by Guiliano v. Cleo,
Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn. 1999); see also Southpace
Properties, Inc. v. Acquisition Group, 5 F.3d 500, 505
(11th Cir. 1993) (applying Alabama law); Browning
Ferris Indus. of Nebraska, Inc. v. Eating Establishment
90th & Fort, Inc., 575 N.W.2d 885, 888-89 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1998); Highgate Assoc., LTD. v. Merryfield, 597
A2d 1280, 1282 (Vt. 1991) (reviewing the totality of
the circumstances).
7

8

Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 100.

9

See id.
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however, the court believed that it should not
interfere with an individual’s business affairs, but
instead should carry out the intentions of the party
unless, of course, the terms of the agreement
violated the second important interest, limitations
set by public policy. 10
Tennessee courts further determine the
validity of liquidated damages clauses by focusing on the substance of the transaction rather
than the descriptive terms or the particular language used in the agreement. In other words,
the parties’ subjective characterization of the liquidated damages clause as an “estimate” of damages (or as a “forfeiture”) does not influence the
court’s decision or preclude it from finding that
the clause is in fact a penalty. 11 Conversely, a
contractual provision need not explicitly include
the term “liquidated damages” to constitute a liquidated damages provision. 12 In short, language
is not dispositive. If the parties agreed in the
contract on the amount of damages to be recovered for compensation upon the occurrence of a
particular defaulting event, then damages are liq-

Id. Where the court briefly discussed violations
of public policy with respect to contract terms, it did
not elaborate on its meaning of “public policy,” but
referred to the case McKay v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 182
S.W. 874 (Tenn. 1916). In McKay, the Tennessee
Supreme Court stated that “the right of private contract
was no small part of the liberty of the citizen, and that
the usual and most important function of courts of
justice was rather to maintain and enforce contracts
than to enable parties thereto to escape from their
obligation on the pretext of public policy, unless it
clearly appeared that such contracts contravened public
right or public welfare.” McKay, 182 S.W. at 876.
Further citing Baltimore & Ohio S.W. Ry. Co. v. Voight,
176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900), the McKay opinion continued:
10

“It must not be forgotten that you are not to
extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a given
contract is void as being against public policy, because,
if there is one thing which more than another public
policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into freely
and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and shall be
enforced by courts of justice. Therefore you have this
paramount public policy to consider; that you are not
lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.” Id.
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uidated unless the contract states otherwise. Tennessee lawyers also should remember that the
courts will not enforce a liquidated damages clause
if the party seeking damages was responsible
for or significantly contributed to the breach.
Finally a lawyer must be aware that there
still remains some variability in the law relating
to the validity of liquidated damage clauses.
Guiliano, of course, now stands as the definitive
statement of the common law rule to be applied
to determine the validity of a liquidated damage
clause that specifies a sum of money to be paid
upon breach. If the contract is for the sale of
goods, however, the validity of such a liquidated
damages clause will not be determined by reference to the common law, but rather by Tenn.
Code Ann. § 47-2-718. 13 Also, in cases in which
the liquidated damages have been cast in the
form of the forfeiture of an existing right, courts
may supplement or replace the traditional liquidated damages analysis with a more general discussion of principles of equity and the law’s abhorrence of forfeitures. In the end, however, it

See Testerman v. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co.,
524 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
11

12

Guiliano, 995 S.W.2d at 97.

13

Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-2-718 (1) and (2) state:

(1) Damages for breach by either party may be
liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount
which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or
actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of
proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of
otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a
penalty.
(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds
delivery of goods because of the buyer’s
breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution of any
amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds:
(a) the amount to which the seller is
entitled by virtue of terms liquidating the seller’s
damages in accordance with subsection (1), or
(b) in the absence of such terms,
twenty percent (20%) of the value of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated under the
contract or five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is
smaller.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-718 (1996).
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is likely that liquidated damages clauses which
pass muster under Guiliano will also pass muster
under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-718 and the more
general equitable principles that have been articulated in cases where the contract calls for a
breaching party to lose rights to which they would
otherwise be entitled.
Using these basic principles, Tennessee
courts will determine the validity of liquidated
damages clauses on a case-by-case basis. Thus,
it is important that lawyers not only understand
the general principles of law, but also the various circumstances in which courts have both invalidated and enforced such clauses. What follows, then, is a sampler of some of the relevant
Tennessee case law pertaining to the validity of
liquidated damages clauses.
II. ENFORCEABLE LIQUIDATED DAMAGE
PROVISIONS
Lawyers may look to several Tennessee
cases for examples of liquidated damage clauses
that have been enforced in spite of a claim by
the party in breach that the clause should be
invalidated as a penalty. Three involve traditional liquidated damage clauses. Two involve
provisions calling for the party in breach to lose
a right to which they otherwise would have been
entitled.
Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc.: 14 As noted
above, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently
rejected the reasoning of those cases in which
the Tennessee Court of Appeals had adopted a
retrospective approach to invalidate a liquidated
damages clause. Guiliano was an employee who
had been constructively terminated from his job
at Cleo, Inc. 15 The trial court granted summary
14

995 S.W.2d 88 (Tenn. 1999).

See id. at 91-92. After several upper management changes in 1994, Cleo, Inc. relieved Guiliano of
all management duties. The company’s new president
stated in his deposition that, based upon his observations of Guiliano’s work performance, Guiliano had a
poor relationship with his peers and subordinates and
that he was not leading his department in a direction
15
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judgment, awarding Guiliano the remainder of
his salary, $90,125, as liquidated damages according to the terms of his contract. Upon review, the Court of Appeals agreed that Guiliano
had been constructively terminated, but held that
the liquidated damages provision imposed an
unenforceable penalty upon the employer. Afterward, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals, upholding the validity of
the liquidated damages agreement.
Guiliano was employed by Cleo, Inc.,
under a three-year contract for an annual salary
of $103,000. The contract, in pertinent part, stated
that “[i]n the event the Company terminated this
Agreement and your employment without cause,
you shall continue to be paid your then current
salary from the date of termination through October 31, 1995.” 16 After Guiliano was asked to
leave, the company agreed to honor the employment agreement so long as he did not accept other employment prior to October 31, 1995.
With approximately eleven months remaining on
his contract with Cleo, Inc., Guiliano accepted
new employment at a higher salary. Cleo, Inc.
dropped Guiliano from its payroll when he began his new job, and Guiliano filed suit.
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals on the issues of uncertainty
and reasonableness of damages amount. Both
courts felt that damages were indeterminable at
the time the parties entered into the contract and
viewed the provision’s estimate of potential liquidated damages as fairly within the contemplation of the parties.17 Clearly, neither Guiliano
nor Cleo, Inc. had certain knowledge whether
Guiliano would be able to secure other employment in the event he was terminated without
cause. Also uncertain was whether Guiliano would
that best suited the company. Id. at 93. He replaced
Guiliano with someone who had more “industry
experience and a successful track record.” Id. The
new company president asked Guiliano to return the
company credit cards in his possession and informed
him that all future assignments, if any, were to be
performed from his home. Id.
16

Id. at 92 (paragraph 7 of employment contract).

17

See id. at 101.
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be able to find a position at the same salary, and
whether he might suffer other damages difficult
to prove such as loss of professional status, prestige, and advancement opportunities.18 Then,
rather than evaluate reasonableness of the stipulated damages in light of what damages were
actually suffered by Guiliano, the Tennessee Supreme Court changed the rule and held that “[t]he
liquidated sum is recoverable based upon [the]
conclusion that it was reasonable at the time the
parties entered into the contract and that it reflects the parties’ original intentions to compensate for a termination of employment.” 19 Under
the new rule, plaintiff’s inability to prove actual
damages was irrelevant; the extent of actual damages no longer has any bearing on the recovery
of liquidated damages. Having held Guiliano’s
lack of proof of actual damages was irrelevant,
the court concluded that he was entitled to recover the full amount stipulated in the contract
provision.
In its conclusion, the court reaffirmed the
importance of the parties’ intent when examining a contract. Given that the parties were in the
best position to know what considerations influenced their bargaining at the time they entered
into the contract, and even though “the bargain
may be an unfortunate one for the delinquent
party, . . . it is not the duty of courts of common
law to relieve parties from the consequences of
their own improvidence.” 20
Vanderbilt Univ. v. DiNardo: 21 Consistent with Guiliano, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a liquidated damage
clause in an employment contract designed to

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

174 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 1999).

Vanderbilt University v. DiNardo, 974 F.Supp.
638, 638 (M.D. Tenn. 1997). The Sixth Circuit Court
affirmed the district court’s judgment that the contract
contained an enforceable liquidated damages provision
and affirmed the portion of the judgment reflecting
damages calculated under the original contract, but
reversed and remanded the district court’s judgment
22
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protect the employer from breach in Vanderbilt
Univ. v. DiNardo . Again, the decisive issues were
whether damages were reasonable and uncertain at the time the contract was signed. DiNardo,
the head football coach for Vanderbilt University, terminated his agreement to accept a position as head coach with another University. As a
result, Vanderbilt brought action against DiNardo
for breach of contract. The district court’s decision, upheld on appeal, was that the liquidated
damages clause was reasonable and enforceable. 22
DiNardo’s employment agreement required him to pay an amount equal to his base
salary, multiplied by the number of years remaining on the contract, in the event of breach.23
Both the trial court and the court of appeals found
that the sum was “reasonable” when compared
to the actual damages likely to be suffered by
Vanderbilt University due to DiNardo’s breach;
potentially substantial damages which included
recruiting a new head coach and staff, loss of
stability in the athletic program, damage to reputation and public relations, lost profits from reduced football ticket sales, lost alumni support,
and sundry other harms. 24 The appellate court
concluded that “the stipulated damage amount
[was] reasonable in relation to the amount of damages that could be expected to result from the
breach.” 25 Moreover, the agreement was reasonable because the contract did not state a lump
sum for damages, but contained a sliding damages scale based upon the length of the contract
term remaining after the breach. 26

concerning enforceability of an addendum to the
contract. This matter was not relevant to the discussion
of liquidated damages, but concerned issues regarding
enforceability of a condition precedent and acceptance.
See DiNardo, 174 F.3d at 759.
23

DiNardo, 974 F.Supp. at 640.

24

Id. at 642.

25

DiNardo, 174 F.3d at 755 (emphasis added).

26

DiNardo, 974 F.Supp. at 642-43.
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In addition to considering the damage
amount reasonable, the court concluded that the
circumstances in DiNardo satisfied another significant element necessary for a valid liquidated
damages clause—damages were properly uncertain at the time the contract was drafted. Although DiNardo’s salary was not directly attributable to specific anticipated damages, salary
amount was reasonable to use for the damages
calculation given the unquantifiable nature of damages in this case. The court noted that “[t]he
potential damage to Plaintiff [Vanderbilt] extends
far beyond the cost of merely hiring a new head
football coach. It is this uncertain potentiality
that the parties sought to address by providing
for a sum certain to apply toward anticipated
expenses and losses.” 27 Defining this “uncertain
potentiality” is an important goal of liquidated
damages clauses in general.
The court noted that DiNardo had the benefit of counsel when drafting his agreement,
pointing out that the damages provision had already been renegotiated and reduced once from
the original amount (gross to net salary). 28 In
fact, the contract contained another liquidated
damages provision, very similar to the clause that
DiNardo argued was unreasonable, that protected
DiNardo in the event that the roles were reversed
and Vanderbilt breached the contract.
City of Memphis v. Ford Motor Co. 29
Ford Motor Co. sought to recover $252,576.78 in
liquidated damages paid after breaching a contract for utility services. The damages amount
was for unsupplied electricity during the time
remaining on the contract between the City of
Memphis and Ford Motor Co. after Ford discontinued its business operations there. The services paid for as stipulated damages were neither rendered nor received. The district court
decided that the City’s charges for unused electricity were valid as liquidated damages because
27

Id. at 642.

28

Id. at 643.

29

304 F.2d 845 (Sixth Cir. 1962).

30

Id. at 853.

31
32

Id. at 845.
Id.
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(1) damages were uncertain at the time of contract, (2) Ford’s responsibility for these costs was
the express intent of the parties, and (3) the City
incurred large expenditures to supply the contractual requirements of Ford. 30 Judgment for
the City was affirmed on appeal to the Sixth Circuit. 31
Ford had contracted to purchase its electricity from the City and agreed to a minimum
monthly payment for a period of five years.
Nevertheless, with 34 ½ months remaining on its
contract, Ford sold its plant, paid those bills which
were due at the time of sale and left town. Ford
contended that it no longer needed electricity at
a location not in use and argued that any interpretation of a damages clause which would oblige
Ford to continue paying for electricity “that the
City did not generate and that Ford would not
and could not use was unusual and oppressive in
its results.”32
The court disagreed with Ford. First, it
found that the parties intended the minimum payments for electric service to continue regardless
of Ford’s requirements. 33 “When an agreement
is fairly and understandingly entered into with a
view to just compensation for the anticipated loss,
there is no sound reason why it should not be
enforced.” 34 Secondly, the court observed that
the damages were properly uncertain at the time
the contract was signed. Upon breach of such a
contract, the stated intention to pay stipulated
sums is given effect because actual damages were
uncertain in nature and amount. 35 No one could
possibly know how much electricity would actually be used. Third, upholding the validity of the
damages provision was equitable when the expenses incurred by the City were taken into account. It was apparent from the record that large
expenditures,
aggregating
more
than
$163,000,000, were paid by the City to meet its
contractual requirements. 36 Ford was “not being
Id. at 848. The contract stated in pertinent part,
“nothing contained in this paragraph shall relieve
customer from any minimum bill requirements.” Id.
33

34

Id. at 852.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 853.
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penalized by being held liable for the payments
it agreed to make, even though it does not take
the electricity, which it agreed to purchase.” 37
Accordingly, the court concluded that the sum of
over $250,000, though large, was reasonable
when all of the facts were considered. 38
Testerman v. Home Beneficial Life
Ins. Co.: 39 Even in the day s when Tennessee
courts were allowed to use a retrospective comparison of damages, liquidated damages clauses
requiring payments greatly in excess of actual
harm to the nonbreaching party could be upheld.
In Testerman, for example, the court found that
liquidated damage amounts well in excess of the
actual damages suffered were both reasonable
and enforceable.
Testerman, a real estate developer, contracted with a lender to borrow $1.5 million and
then sued for a refund of the $30,000 standby
deposit fee when the loan was not consummated. 40 Tester man argued that, because interest rates had increased, the lender actually suffered no damage but instead benefitted from the
breach because he could now lend the money at
a higher rate. 41 Testerman further asserted that
since the lender suffered no financial damages,
the standby fee constituted an uncollectible and
unenforceable penalty. On the other hand, the
lender claimed that, although out-of-pocket costs
to the lender were only $3877.35, due to the
loss of participation in rents the total loss to the
loan company would amount to $97,000. 42 The
loan company was unable, however, to point to

Id. The court further stated that “where a party
bound by an executory contract repudiates his obligations or disables himself from performing them before
the time for performance, the promisee has the option
to treat the contract as ended, so far as further performance is concerned, and maintain an action at once for
the damages occasioned by such anticipatory breach.”
Id. at 852.
37

38

Id. at 853.

39

524 S.W.2d 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).

See id. at 666. Amid other objections,
Testerman argued that the loan commitment letter was
ambiguous because it provided for a fee if the loan was
closed, but said nothing regarding disposition of the fee
in the event the transaction was not consummated.
40
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any particular loan they failed to make because
of their commitment to Testerman. 43
The court found that the standby fee was
reasonable based upon the circumstances “as
viewed from the vantage point of the parties on
the date of execution of their agreement, not on
the basis of what did happen, but rather on what
could or might have happened.” 44 The court
also based its determination on principles of equity and fair dealing. Specifically, the lender
was required by the terms of the contract to keep
$1,500,000 million dollars available to Testerman
for a period of twenty months, and it did so in
good faith. 45 By contrast, Tester man’s conduct
embodied a considerable lack of good faith which
clearly displeased the court. After the contract
was signed, Testerman had found a different
lender with whom he could deal more advantageously and then sought to capitalize on the fact
that the lender was able to recoup its losses.
Based upon the circumstances, the court found
the liquidated damages clause reasonable and
announced that “a court of equity [sh]ould be the
last place [for Testerman] to seek relief.” 46
Moreover, the court determined that
standby fees similar to the one in Testerman’s
agreement are standard and used by most loan
companies. 47 The fee was acceptable as partial
consideration for Testerman’s loan commitment
and, in the absence of oppression and overreaching, was likewise enforceable. 48 Although the
court did not discuss the uncertainty of damages
in this type of transaction, lost opportunity to
loan the money elsewhere is clearly a legitimate
The court believed that disposition of the fee was
implicit in the agreement, but did not refer to what
specific language led them to this conclusion. Id. at
669-70.
41

Id. at 670 (emphasis added).

42

Id. at 668.

43

Id.

Id. at 670. Note the court’s use of a prospective analysis.
44

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id. at 668.

48

Id. at 669.
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albeit unpredictable concern and could have provided a basis for validating the liquidated damages provision.
Lastly, the Testerman court reaffirmed that
the words used by parties in contracts are not
conclusive proof as to the intent of the parties
respecting their agreement or the court’s evaluation of the stipulated damages sum. For purposes of determining whether the amount specified in a contract is a penalty or liquidated damages, contract drafters must bear in mind that the
particular words used in the writing are not determinative because it is the substance of the
transaction, and not the words, that govern. In
this case, the court pointed specifically to the
word “forfeited,” used by the loan company in a
letter to Testerman, and said that use of the word
did not change the substance of the transaction.49
Nonetheless, lawyers drafting liquidated damages
clauses should be careful to avoid words such as
“forfeit,” or “penalty,” which imply that the provision is other than a proper clause. It does not
hurt to include language such as, “in the event
that . . ., X shall pay to Y the sum of . . . as
liquidated damages and not as a penalty.” While
such language is hardly dispositive, it places one
more obstacle in the way of a breaching party
seeking to set aside the provision as a penalty.
Kendrick v. Alexander: 50 Kendrick, a prospective purchaser of real property priced at
$500,000, filed action against the seller, Alexander,
to recover amounts forfeited when the contract
failed to close. There were two sums in issue:
(1) an initial down payment of $10,000, which
would be credited toward the purchase price,
but would be forfeited if Kendrick failed to complete the purchase and (2) in connection with
two separate extensions of the closing date, an
additional $50,000 earnest money, which would
also be credited toward the purchase price, but
would likewise be forfeited if the purchase failed.
Finally, as consideration for yet one more extension of the closing deadline, Kendrick agreed to
pay Alexander $50,000 that would not be cred-

39

ited toward the $500,000 purchase price but
would be retained by Alexander whether or not
the purchase was completed.
Ultimately,
Kendrick was unable to secure the purchase
funds, Alexander sold the property to someone
else for $550,000, and Kendrick filed suit to recover the sums paid as earnest money, alleging
that the forfeiture provisions in the contract were
invalid as a penalty.
Treating the contract as one that called for a
forfeiture of $110,000 as stipulated damages for
the buyer’s breach, the trial court held that the
forfeiture was a penalty rather than a reasonable
effort to estimate damages that would be difficult
to prove. 51 The Tennessee Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the final payment of
$50,000 should not have been treated as liquidated damages, but rather as separate consideration for the final extension of the deadline for
closing. Viewing the remaining $60,000 as monies withheld as stipulated damages, the court then
concluded that this sum, representing 12% of the
total purchase price of $500,000, was not an unreasonable amount—particularly when some portion of the increase in liquidated damages might
be viewed as consideration for the first two extensions of the closing deadline. 52 The court also
emphasized that these terms were bargained for
by the parties and that there was no evidence of
oppression or overreaching in the transaction. 52
III. UNENFORCEABLE PROVISIONS
It is also important that lawyers who are
drafting liquidated damages clauses be aware of
the various circumstances in which Tennessee
courts have refused to enforce stipulated damages provisions and why. Courts do not enforce
damage provisions which are unreasonable when
compared to the damages that one would expect
to be suffered upon breach, and they do not
accept stipulated damage amounts where damages would be certain or easy to calculate. Likewise, fixed damages which are not adjustable for
the severity of the breach but which take the

49

Id.

52

Id. at 190-91.

50

844 S.W.2d 187 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

53

Id. at 191.

51

Id. at 189.

Volume 1 Number 1

Fall 1999

Transactions TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

40

form of a lump sum no matter what the offending action may be are generally disfavored. The
following cases highlight those conditions and
circumstances that have led courts to rule that a
liquidated damages clause was unenforceable as
a matter of law.
Beasley v. Horrell: 54 As part of a sale
and leaseback agreement on two buildings owned
by the Beasleys, Horrell executed a nonnegotiable promissory note in the amount of $100,000
payable to the Beasleys. The leases required
the Beasleys to make a variety of payments including rent, all taxes and assessments, premiums for property damage and liability insurance,
all utility bills, and certain types of repairs. In
addition, Horrell’s promissory note contained a
cancellation provision which stated that, in the
event of default in the payment of any rent or
any other payments due under the leases, the
indebtedness represented by the note “shall be
automatically revoked and the note shall ipso
facto be null and void.” 55
Eleven months later, the Beasleys were
no longer able to make all of the payments required under one of their leases, so they entered
an agreement with Horrell to effectively terminate that lease and to facilitate the sale of the
building. At the time of the sale, the Beasleys
owed a total of only $5810.70 in unpaid rent,
taxes, and insurance. As a result of this deficiency, however, Horrell voided the note and
the Beasleys brought suit.
The Court of Appeals held that the cancellation provision was unenforceable, in part,
because the damages were ascertained, not by
reasonable calculation of any kind, but solely by
an arbitrary lump sum set out in the agreement.56
The Beasley court did not like the fact that, under

54
55
56

the express terms of the note, the plaintiffs would
“forfeit” the entire principal amount of $100,000,
plus up to $40,000 in interest, if they were late
in making even one of the many payments due
under the agreement. 57 The court calculated that
the foreseeable damages to the lender were equal
to only the amount of the missed payments, and
that this amount could not fall anywhere near
$100,000. 58 A single lump sum, the court concluded, cannot be construed as a reasonable approximation of compensation for breach of each
individual covenant listed in the contract. 59
Secondly, the damage clause would not
be given effect because damages (i.e., unpaid
rent, taxes due, insurance) were easily
ascertainable at the time of contract. When it is
apparent that it will be easy to determine at the
time of breach the amount of damage caused by
the breach, it is unnecessary and inappropriate
to have a liquidated damages clause.60 Liquidated damage clauses are intended only to be
suitable when damages are uncertain, not when
they can be precisely ascertained as was possible in this case.
Kimbrough & Co. v. Schmitt: 61 In
Kimbrough, the court found a provision unenforceable as a penalty for reasons similar to those
discussed in the Beasley decision: the stipulated
damages were not a reasonable forecast of the
damages likely to occur in the event of default,
and it would not have been difficult for Kimbrough
to ascertain or prove damages at the time of
breach.
The buyer, Schmitt, contracted to buy residential property from Kimbrough and agreed to
a financing period of three years. The provision
governing the seller’s damages in the event of
buyer default said that if the buyer defaulted in

864 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993).

58

Id. at 51.

Id.

59

Id. at 49.

See id. at 49.

60

Id.

61

939 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

See id. The record does not reflect whether the
word “forfeit” was used descriptively by the court in
reference to the effect of the agreement or whether it
was included in the language of the contract.
57
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buyer default said that if the buyer defaulted in
any payment required by the contract or the promissory note, the buyer agreed to pay to the seller
as liquidated damages an amount equal to 15%
of the original contract price ($71,658.57). 62 The
liquidated damages amount was to be reduced
by 1% for each year that the buyer made all
payments as required by the contract.
Schmitt made payments satisfactorily
throughout the five-year period of the contract,
at the end of which Kimbrough accelerated the
note causing the entire debt to be due.63 Schmitt
did not have the money to pay off the note at
that time, and his attempts to sell the property
were also unsuccessful. So, Kimbrough retook
possession of the property and demanded liquidated damages in the amount of 13% of the original purchase price, as well as interest at a rate of
ten percent.64
Similarly to the unenforceable contract
terms in Beasley, the liquidated damages provision in Kimbrough’s contract provided for a very
large damage amount in the event the defendant
defaulted on any one of his payments. 65 But
even though the provision in Kimbrough reduced
damages for each year that payments were satisfactorily made (unlike the disfavored Beasley provision which did not contain a sliding scale nor
adjust the damages according to when the breach
occurred), this did little to bring the liquidated
damages amount within reason. 66 In its discussion, the court described the results of this provision as having “unconscionable consequences.”67•6
Finally, as in Beasley, the court also based
its decision on the fact that damages were n o t
uncertain and that they would be easy to calculate in case of breach. 68 Both criteria, damage
certainty and ease of calculation, are factors the
resence of which makes stipulated damage

41

amounts inappropriate in business contracts. For
these reasons, the trial court held the damage
clause invalid and unenforceable as a penalty
Harmon v. Eggers: 69 It is well-settled
in Tennessee law that forfeitures and penalties
are not favored by the courts, and “where there
is a doubt whether a sum is in fact a penalty or
liquidated damages, courts are inclined to hold
the former.” 70 Unlike the enforceabl e forfeitures
in Testerman and Kendrick, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals concluded in Harmon that a forfeiture was “contrary to the interests of justice.” 71
The Harmons dispute concerned a real estate sale contract for the purchase of a house and
lot. The contract provided that failure of the
Harmons to make any monthly installment when
due would be a breach of the contract for which
the sellers could retake possession without notice. At default, according to their agreement, all
monies previously paid by the Harmons would
be retained by the sellers as liquidated damages
for the breach. The Harmons paid a total of
$32,000 toward the purchase price of $63,000
before they stopped, allegedly due to a dispute
over a drain field. Upon eviction, they brought
suit to recover the sums they had paid.
The court of appeals relied upon the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Beaden v.
Bransford Realty Co.72 when they determined
whether this type of provision provides for liquidated damages or, in fact, assesses a penalty.
The plaintiff in Beaden entered into an agreement with a realty company to purchase real
property. (The option contract contained a liquidated damages provision quite similar to the one
in the Harmon case.) When the plaintiff allowed the repossession to occur, his payments
totaled 53% of the purchase price. The facts
made it “perfectly clear” to the Beaden court that

62

Id. at 107.

68

Id.

63

Id.

68

699 S.W.2d 159 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

See id. at 109.

67

Id.
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Financial Ltd., 595 S.W.2d 474, 484 (Tenn. 1980).
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Harmon, 699 S.W. at 164.

72

232 S.W. 958 (Tenn. 1921).
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the provision was a mere penalty and putting
the plaintiff out of possession was tantamount to
declaring a forfeiture.73 The court commented
that, “[u]nder such circumstances, on declaration
of the forfeiture, the rights of the parties should
be settled upon the basis of permitting . . . a
recovery of all purchase money paid, as well as
the amounts paid for taxes and insurance, subject
to a credit for reasonable rent.” 74
Similarly, the Harmon court concluded
that the liquidated damages clause, being nothing more than a penalty, was unenforceable. 75
The court announced that “to give effect to the
‘liquidated damages’ provision . . . under these
facts would be equivalent to our sanctioning a
forfeiture/penalty, contrary to the interests of justice. This we cannot do.” 76
Schimpf v. Tennessee Mfg. Co.: 77 A
minor employee was required by contract to automatically forfeit all wages due him if he quit
without giving two weeks notice. The court found
this type of damages clause to be “an unreasonable and oppressive forfeiture,” and that “no such
forfeiture could be enforced against wages which
an employer was to have paid his employee
before he committed a breach of duty.”78 In
addition, the court expressed its disfavor regarding contract clauses which do not require that the
damage awards vary with the seriousness of the
breach. 79 So, abhorrence of a forfeiture and a
liking for adjustable damages, according to
breaches of various sort, appear to be long-standing principles. As the Court stated: “[n]o system
of laws would command our respect, or secure
willing obedience, which did not, to some extent, provide against the mischief resulting from
improvidence, carelessness, inexperience and
under expectations on one side, and skill, avarice, and a gross violation of the principles of
honesty on the other.” 80

IV. CONCLUSION
Liquidated damage clauses are an excellent device to help prevent and settle disputes
and also to provide for fair compensation to the
nonbreaching party in the event of a breach where
damages would be indeterminable or difficult to
prove. The contract drafter who successfully
crafts a valid liquidated damages clause acceptable to both parties will save the parties both
time and expense in the event the contract is
breached. The overarching concern of the courts
when deciding liquidated damages cases is the
reasonableness of the provision. To satisfy this
standard, a valid damages provision must reflect
that the parties contemplated in advance what
damage amounts would reasonably flow from a
failure to perform as promised.
It bears reemphasis that courts in Tennessee will now be using a prospective approach to
determine the validity of stipulated damages. 81
If agreed to, a clause providing for damages
greatly in excess of actual losses is enforceable.
Finally, courts look to the language used by the
parties in the contract. Be wary. Although contractual terms are not determinative per se, care
must be exercised in their selection because a
court may attribute their plain meaning to them.
A contract drafter should remember the default
rule: that courts will resolve any doubts whether
a provision serves as a penalty or as reasonable
compensation for a breach in favor of finding a
penalty in most cases.
The reasonableness of contractually specified damages will be determined on a case-bycase basis, as illustrated by comparing the results
in Kendrick82 and Kimbrough. 83
The “reasonable” damage clause in Kendrick called for damages calculated at 12% of the transaction amount,
but the court in Kimbrough labeled damages val-

73

Harmon, 699 S.W.2d at 163.

79

74

Id. at 163-64.

80-

75

Id. at 164.

81

See supra notes 6-10, 14-19 and accompanying

76

Id.

77

6 S.W. 131 (Tenn. 1887).

82

See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.

Id.

83

See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.

78
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ued at 15% of the transaction “totally unreasonable.” These results are partially reconciled by
examining the circumstances presented to the
court as it searched for justice between all the
parties. In Kendrick, the case involved sophisticated parties, experienced in the area of real
estate, doing business with the benefit of counsel. And, the 12% stipulated damage amount in
Kendrick included consideration for additional
terms. The parties knew, or should have known,
what they were doing. The court specifically
observed that there was no evidence of fraud or
overreaching in the case. On the other hand, the
contract in Kimbrough was called “unconscionable.” This case concerned the purchase of a
home by an ordinary homeowner who had been
faithfully making payments to his lender for five
years. If the damages provision was strictly upheld, the borrower stood to lose everything he
had paid plus liquidated damages when
Kimbrough accelerated the note. This the Court
thought was “unconscionable” rather than “reasonable.” Drafters of liquidated damage clauses
will be well-served to keep in mind the idea that
if something smells bad, a court will find a way
to conclude that it is rotten.
In Tennessee, liquidated damage clauses
are more likely to be enforced if they call for
payment of sums that vary depending on the
nature and timing of the breach rather than for
the payment of a lump sum for any breach. Case

43

law also counsels that liquidated damages should
be specified only when damages will be difficult
to ascertain or are uncertain at the time of contract. Damages are readily determinable in financial matters such as loan agreements and real
estate contracts. Where the contract concerns
land, often the remedy for breach by the seller is
specific performance which does not involve
money damages. If monetary damages are called
for, the proper amount could probably be ascertained as a function of the market value of the
property, contrary to a sum stipulated in advance.
On the other hand, agreements concerning employment and service contracts involve circumstances quite dissimilar to those found in money
exchanges and land deals. For instance, the situations in Guiliano, 84 DiNardo, 85 and City of Memphis, 86 offer examples of situations in which the
damages actually suffered would be difficult, if
not impossible, to prove with reasonable certainty. In these and similar cases, liquidated damages clauses are not merely proper, but also a
valuable tool to be used by businesspeople, with
the assistance of knowledgeable legal counsel,
to reduce the likelihood of litigation in the event
that one of the parties cannot perform as promised.
84

See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.

85

See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.

86

See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
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